Canyonville Oct. 29th 1855

Yours in haste
    S. Gordon
        Capt. Douglas County volunteers

Yours    Gordon

Still Later--The Indians Victorious--Several Whites Killed.

Memorandum--
List of Killed, Wounded and Missing
of Col. Ross' Militia in the Battle of Grave Creek Hills
of the 31st Oct. & 1st Nov.

Movement of the Troops in Rogue River Valley.

The Indian War.

    FRIEND DRYER:--We have at last had a battle with the red devils who have lately so desolated our fair land with all the horrors of Indian war. The whites had thought that the Indians were encamped in the vicinity of the "meadows," and had been making arrangements to attack them there. While the citizens along the road, having been lulled into a false security, were thinking that they were perfectly safe, [they] were all of a sudden attacked in Cow Creek Valley, south of the Canyon, on Tuesday evening, Oct. 23d, by a large band of Indians--some say from sixty to one hundred in number--their houses burned, their stock killed and driven off, and those who happened to be alone upon the road brutally murdered. Holland Bailey, of Lane County, was killed near the foot of the big hill south of Cow Creek; Chas. Johnson, orderly sergeant of Rinearson's company, was shot through the head while endeavoring to get a wounded man out of reach of the Indians; his body was mangled in a horrible manner. Mr. Minot was severely wounded in the abdomen; Daniel Boone was wounded in the hip. All the houses in the valley but three were burned down. The houses that are standing are Elliff's, Levens' and Smith's. All the grain in the valley was burned except that belonging to Levins and Smith. Large numbers of cattle were driven off to the mountains. A part of Capt. Rinearson's command were stationed in Cow Creek Valley, but there were not enough of them to prevent the Indians from destroying their property. Those that were there behaved like men.
    On Tuesday evening, Oct. 25th, Lieut. Kautz, with twelve men, while viewing a route for a military road, came on to a camp of Indians in the Cow Creek hills, and not knowing that they were hostile was surprised and driven from the ground. Two of his men were killed. The hiding place of the Indians was found, and preparations were made for an attack. Maj. Fitzgerald started immediately with his command, but after seeing the position that the Indians occupied, he did not deem it prudent for him to attack them with so small a force. Measures were then taken to concentrate all the regular and volunteer forces that could be raised. On Tuesday night, Oct. 26th, at 11 o'clock, Capt. Smith, in command of the regulars (Fitzgerald unfortunately was sick) and Col. Ross, in command of the volunteers, started on foot for the encampment of the Indians. We arrived at their old camp about daylight, and some of the regulars very injudiciously built a fire. In a short time we heard the Indians on the main dividing ridge between Cow Creek and Grave Creek, firing signal guns, and the whole body of men started for them. To get where the Indians were, we had to cross over a deep ravine and follow along the ridge of the hill about two miles. Capt. Smiley Harris had early in the morning crept up with his command to within half a mile of the Indians without their seeing him, but as soon as he saw the smoke he let the Indians know where he was, and they started out to attack him, but on seeing the men under Smith and Ross coming along the ridge of the mountain, they retreated to a high point of the ridge and there awaited the coming of the whites. Just at that time it would have been hard to tell a commander from a private, for they were all rushing along as fast as their legs could carry them to the point where the Indians were. As soon as they got within gunshot, the Indians retreated into a deep, timbered ravine, the waters of which run into Cow Creek, and the volunteers and regulars pursued on after them. In the ravine the most of the fighting was done. On the night of the 31st, we encamped in a hollow near a spring close to the battleground. That night will long be remembered by those who were there. The night was very cold, and what few blankets we had with us were used by the wounded, the rest having to keep themselves warm the best way they could. There was not an ax or a spade upon the ground. The volunteers had nothing to eat since Tuesday night, and were weary for want of sleep. On the morning of the 1st of November, the Indians came around on the points and commenced firing at us, but by the prompt action of Col. Ross they were driven off. Shortly after, a party of whites came in with horses to take away the wounded.
    Those who are acquainted with the Indians say there must be about three hundred Indians in this band. It is impossible now for a person to tell how many Indians were killed in the battle, but it is supposed that as many as twenty of them were made to bite the dust.
     Dr. [Anson G.] Henry was on the ground, and in the thickest of the fight, and after the battle was over he acted the part of the good Samaritan among the wounded and dying. Dr. Stone was there, and doing his utmost to relieve the wounded.
     I obtained the following list of the killed and wounded from Dr. Henry, and I think it is correct.
     Capt. Harris' Company--Jonathan Pettegrew, killed; Ira Mayfield, L. F. Allen, Wm. Purnell, and ------ Harris, severely wounded; Thos. Goldsby, Thos. Gill, slightly wounded.
     Capt. Bruce's Company--Charles Goodwin, severely wounded.
     Capt. Welton's Company--John Kennedy, severely wounded.
     Capt. Williams' Company--John Winters, killed; John Stanus, severely wounded; Thos. Ryan, slightly wounded.
     Capt. Rinearson's Company--Henry Pearl and Jacob W. Miller, killed; James Pearcy, missing; Washington H. Crouch, severely wounded; Enoch Miller and E. Yager, slightly wounded.
     Capt. Gordon's Company--James M. Fordice, Wm. Wilson, Hawkins Shelton, severely wounded.
     Capt. Bailey's Company--John Gilespie, killed; John Walton, John C. Richardson, James Lapher, Thomas J. Awbrey, severely wounded; John Pankey, slightly wounded.
     Killed 9, missing 1, severely wounded 13, slightly wounded 12. Total 35.
     Capt. Smith of the regulars had 4 killed and 7 wounded, including Lieutenant Gibson (none mortally). One of Smith's men shot himself accidentally, on the night of the 1st of Nov., by drawing a gun towards him over a log. Three of the men wounded were wounded by the accidental discharge of a gun in camp, on the night of the 31st of October.
     There are but few Indian sympathizers in this part of the country, and he who would sympathize with hostile Indians now is worse than an Indian--an enemy to his country, a disgrace to himself and a dishonor to his race. It is to be regretted that there are men among us who will so much endanger the country as to attack and kill friendly Indians. Such things have been done. We have enough to do to fight Indians that are hostile.
Weekly Oregonian, Portland, November 24, 1855, page 2


    *    *    *   You will excuse me for taking notice of the following, but it is too good to lose. T. McF. Patton was with the detachment moving to Cow Creek. T. says he ran a narrow risk. I was with him or near him all the way from Grave Creek to Smith's, and I am sure he never saw four Indians, and they shot at some hogs in an opposite direction to that of T. McF., but not at him or any man. Nothing of less caliber than a six-pounder could have reached him from the point where the Indians were and the point which Tom occupied momentarily. No more concerning small fry.
    The detachment stopped in Cow Creek Valley for three days, and were ordered to Grave Creek; there they joined Capt. Smith and Ross. A force of three hundred and seventy-eight men moved against the Indians in Grave Creek Hills, and on the 31st Oct. the Indians were discovered and attacked. Capt. Smith ordered a charge, which was faintly complied with. The fight became general, and every man was his own captain and fought on his own hook. We hauled off near dark and took quarters in the head of a ravine. On the morning of 1st Nov. the Indians attacked us. We fought them about two hours, and I think they found us as good in the brush as they were. While we were fighting in the morning. Dr. Henry assumed command and ordered a man to leave his position and take another, when the cub drew his rifle upon Henry and ordered him to leave there d----d quick, which order H. complied with in double-quick time.
    The whole force left the field and repaired to the Six Bit House, where features of various kinds presented themselves, such as Henry's retreat from the Six Bit House, &c.
    Capts. Buoy's and Bailey's companies were stationed here in the meantime; there were some aspiring lieutenants, who no doubt earnestly desired promotion, and true to Know-Nothing instincts were willing to sacrifice their best best friends to promote their own selfish purposes; they solicited Major Martin to order a new election, urging as a reason that the organization at the time Martin was elected was incomplete &c. The Major not desiring to command men who were unwilling to be commanded by him, and to use his own phrase, hoping a better man would be found, ordered a new election. A deputation was sent from Bailey's company to Buoy's, a caucus was held (nothing political, of course), and the result was that Capt. Bailey was selected to oppose Maj. Martin; not that the least objection could be found to Martin, but, as was said by "Sam," because "Bailey was a good Whig." In justice to Capt. Bailey, it might be said that he had nothing to do with this arrangement, yet at the same time, being present when the vote of his company was taken, he took good care not to decline, neither did he vote for Martin as it was understood he would.
    Now I for one can discern but little difference between honest morality and moral honesty, and I like to see the fair thing in politics as in everything else, and I must confess that as an unsuspecting Democrat I must say that I was inclined in the incipient stage of affairs to discard anything like political distinctions, and went in heartily voting for Know-Nothing and everything else, supposing all right. It did not occur to me that these Know-Nothings had adopted this stop-thief cry for the purpose of avoiding suspicion, but imagine my chagrin and disappointment in finding all the places of importance filled with the most obnoxious Know-Nothings in the land, with nothing to recommend them in the service save their liberality--bigotry, and well-known unpopularity with the people. It would seem that these very generous, liberal and anti-party gentlemen have well played their games, and have succeeded by a kind of hocus pocus management in getting all the offices.
    I learn that petitions are out for the removal of all Know-Nothings from office, holding any appointments from and under the Executive. I heartily concur in the principle.
    I have written before, but owing to some shenanigan in the commissary's department you have not received my communications. I will write again whenever I can interest you.
Oregon Statesman, Corvallis, December 1, 1855, page 1


Shasta Courier, Shasta, California, December 1, 1855, page 3

  Dear Genl.:
    Agreeable to promise, I write you, and I think it will take about a sheet of this size to hold all I have got to tell you. I returned a few days ago from my expedition to Fort Lane after a trip varied with adventure and hardships more than I bargained for when I set out. I left here on the 1st of October, and succeeded in satisfying myself that a road can be made from here to Fort Lane with some expense. I had set out with ten men armed with axes only, and we had a guide making twelve of us. On the 14th we reached Big Bend and learned from peaceable Indians that the bands in the valley had broken out into a war. So I abandoned the axes and went back for guns to arm my men with. I relied but little on the rumor but I thought best to prepare. I had given up all hopes of seeing any Indians and had reached within six miles of the Oregon Road on the divide between Grave Creek and Cow Creek on the 25th ult. when I suddenly ran right into a large encampment of them on a high knoll on the top of a spur of the divide. I was not certain that they were hostile until they fired into us. We were ready for them and fought them for half an hour, my men were raw recruits and knew nothing about Indian fighting and were considerably “flustered,” and the guide he wanted to back out so I had difficulty to keep them to the mark, but suddenly the Indians got upon our flank, and three shots in quick succession from our right killed two of my men dead, and the third knocked me over, when the rest broke and all h_ll would not have stopped them. Fortunately a small memorandum book in my right flannel shirt pocket prevented the ball from penetrating, and I jumped up immediately and tried to rally my men but it was of no avail, I could not even get them to drive off our animals and I was compelled to make a “glorious retreat” with the loss of two men all my animals, and provisions and “traps.” Night favored our escape; we doubled on the Indian camp and got down upon Wolf Creek and going up it we reached the “Six Bit House” which we found abandoned but were fortunate enough to find a few potatoes and a little butter which served to help us on to Grave Creek where we found a stockade around Harkness and Twogood’s stand. There were about ten men there who were thrown into a great excitement by our approach, and if we had not called out to them they would have fired into us for Indians, from which you may infer the state of affairs. I then learned the particulars of the war, and how the troops and volunteers had been scouring the country (up and down the high roads) for two weeks and had not been able to find an Indian. I immediately dispatched an express to Maj. Fitzgerald at Evans Ferry; it was two o’clock at night when we got in and the next evening he arrived. On the 27th I went up with him to the ground where I had lost the two men and found their bodies and buried them. The Indians had moved their encampment about three miles, back from the spur to the main divide. We had seventy men and intended to fight them but when the Maj. saw the camp which they had abandoned, he came to the conclusion that they were too strong for us and we marched back to Grave Creek as though we had not discovered them, though they saw us. Here we found Capt. Smith who had arrived with some additional men. Expresses were sent out to all the volunteer forces and the Capt. sent to Fort Lane for more ammunition, arms and provisions enough for a fifteen days campaign. As they intended to organize a regular expedition, I concluded that I would join them and when they had driven the Indians off my trail I would return to Port Orford by the way I came, so I proceed to Fort Lane and fitted out my party anew and was back again in three days. Maj. F. had returned to the fort sick. I wanted them to take the howitzer but no one at the fort would take the responsibility of taking it along, and I was also astonished that Dr. Crane did not accompany us, but he said he would not go without Capt. Smith’s orders. When I returned to Grave Creek I begged of the Capt. to send for the Dr. and for the howitzer; he said it was too late, that we would have to do without them. I replied that late or early he would send for the doctor anyhow, and that he would wish he had the howitzer before he was done. My experience had taught me that it would be no child’s play and I also felt that the Indians would make a stand, yet they prepared for the fight as though they expected the Indians to run and that the great difficulty would be to get the red devils to stand. When I reached Grave Creek all the troops had arrived. There were about two hundred and fifty volunteers under Col. Ross and about 130 regulars under Capt. Smith. A beautiful plan of battle was agreed upon. One detachment of volunteers was to occupy the divide on the west; another was to start out from the Six Bit House and take position on the north, and Col. Ross with the volunteers was to come in on the south and all were to wait for Capt. Smith to make the attack on the east. We set out about 12 o’clock on the night of the 30th and moved along with as much precision and silence as could have been desired at first, but the nearer we got to the enemy the more careless and noisy they were. When we got upon the ground where I had met the Indians, Col. Ross was to separate from Capt. Smith. The party that had to occupy the west had already left us. I pointed out to Capt. Smith the position of the Indians, the course he was to take and the way Col. Ross must go, and as it was already daylight I urged the necessity of going on rapidly. Col. Ross thought he had better wait until the other party had taken position on the west, and the Capt was anxious that the only two officers he had with him, who had indiscreetly filled their canteens with brandy instead of water, should get sober, and they delayed an hour and a half or two hours. In the meantime the detachment that was to occupy the north came in behind us on our trail; they had mistaken their trail, and adopted ours. It was a cold foggy morning, and the men started up fires to keep warm. I pointed out the position of the Indians to the Col. and the Capt. but they said they could see no Indians and they did not believe there was any Indians there. No sooner however did the smoke curl up between the trees than the hillsides were covered with Indians driving in their stock and preparing for battle. It was now too late for a surprise, but I again urged the Capt. to move and not delay any longer. He said he should move immediately. But before he got started a party of "harum scarum" volunteers got the start of him and led the way down into a deep gulch some fifteen hundred feet which intervened between us and the enemy. Instead of complying with the plan of attack agreed upon and going around on the ridge the Capt. followed them, leaving his train and Lt. Alston, who was not yet sober. Gibson made out to follow. By the time we got up with the Indians, we were very much used up and the plan of attack was effectually knocked in the head by the fourth party joining, so instead of having surrounded the Indians we were all together. In the first meet the Indians gave up their position. One of ours was killed and several wounded, and this one dead man won the battle; two thirds of the men never got past this one dead body. The Indians took up a position just beyond a sink in the ridge that protected their squaws and children who were moving to their rear, along the main ridge. The north side of the ridge was covered with heavy growth of fir timber and thick undergrowth, the south without trees but a dense brush of hawthorn, hazel and oak. Totally unfavorable for a charge, but the most desirable for flanking. Some thirty or forty men succeeded in advancing to the brow of the knoll the Indians had abandoned and which they commanded now, where we kept up a fire quite sharp for three hours or more when we gradually hauled off and before night it had ceased. The rest of the troops were behind and occasionally fired at those of our men in front who had the courage to advance towards the Indians. Everything was “helter skelter.” Capt. Smith and Col. Ross were behind taking care of the wounded. At night we hauled off down on the hillside about four hundred yards into a little gulch where the Indians had got their water from some dirty little springs. I begged the Col. and the Capt. not to camp there, they thought it was a bad place, but still they camped there. I had represented during the afternoon to the Capt. the necessity of either moving back to our train, or else to send for it to come up as we had nothing to eat since the night before and no blankets. Neither was done, and we hovered around little brush fires, cold and hungry, the sides of the little gulch so steep that we could scarcely find room for the wounded. Things were very gloomy. I never was so depressed in my life. I felt certain that the Indians would attack us and if made in the night with a proper skill would complete our overthrow. Everybody felt this so much so that when a tremulous volunteer on post accidentally pressed too hard upon the trigger of his revolver and off it went, so did everybody else for the brush, stumbling over the wounded, whose shrieks could be heard above the tumult. One sleepy volunteer, when the stampede [began], started out of his sleep, snatched up a musketoon and cracked away at what he conceived to be the enemy and wounded two of his brother volunteers, one mortally, and a third slightly. Old Doctor Henry called them to order and explained the difficulty and thus settled their nerves. At daylight the Indians came down upon us. The attack however was not well sustained, and after several hours firing they hauled off in consequence of the arrival of a company of Willamette volunteers who were very anxious to fight, and I supposed that the attack on the Indians would be renewed now that the force was considerably increased, but instead they packed up the wounded and moved off and we did not reach Grave Creek until between two and three o’clock that night, having fasted for fifty hours, and had no sleep for three nights. Thus [illegible] fifteen days expedition for Capt. Smith returned with all haste back to Fort Lane, and the volunteers were billeted out to various [illegible] in the valley. We lost ten killed and twenty-seven wounded, several of these were killed and quite a number of the wounded were shot by our own men. The Indian loss of course not known; I do not think that they could have more than four or five killed and wounded, but if we are to believe the statements of all those in the fight there is scarcely a man that cannot give the particulars of how he killed one Indian “certain, sure.” I believe I had as good an opportunity as any in the fight and I can’t say that I killed one. I don’t believe that the Indians numbered over seventy warriors in all; the volunteers say however that there was three or four hundred; when I ask them where they came from, they cannot make over a hundred and fifty supposing that all the hostile Indians were there that are in the valley, and at the same time they assert that there are other bands in various other portions of the valley that could not have been in the fight. It is asserted however that they have reinforced their ranks very much from the coast, but I happen to be posted up on the subject and know that there could not have been any coast Indians present. The unpleasant truth is that the whites were cowards, that they were whipped out by one-fourth of their number of Diggers, and had it not been for thirty or forty good men the rest would have broke and run, and they would have caught h__l. As it was some did break and never stopped until they got through the Canyon 25 miles distant the same day the attack commenced, and some thirty or more men came in to Jacksonville express from Col. Ross, and never returned. The great secret of the failure is that the volunteers expected the regulars to do all the fighting, whilst the regulars were expecting the same thing from the volunteers. I do not think much of the conduct of the officers, nobody attempted to lead the men, and I don’t think that Col. Ross or Capt. Smith attempted to fire a gun. There was a want of confidence all around. On the morning of the 1st of Nov., when the Indians attacked us (which attack was made by about twenty Indians according to my estimate), Capt. Smith was as usual attending to the wounded and Col. Ross did for once show that he was in command by standing down in the gulch and quoting all the gallant speeches that had been made from the Revolution [illegible] such as “Stand your ground men and don’t fire until you see the whites of their eyes and know he is an Injun.” Altogether it was an affair that I would never boast of and no one shall even now that I was there or had anything to do with it, unless he gets it from somebody else. I had no one under me except five, my men who would have abandoned me five days before had I been so badly hurt as not to pack myself off. I determined to leave them to fight their own battles and took advantage of my orders “to return to this post as soon as possible,” to leave them. It is a war they have brought on themselves; the Indians are fighting in self defense and they fight well. I have every reason to believe that it has been gotten up expressly to procure another appropriation. I fear you paid them too well for their meritorious services of ’53. War is a money making business. When I left they had nearly a thousand troops in the field and I venture to say they will get whipped again notwithstanding the comparatively small number of Indians, unless they fight. Capt. Smith wished me to stay and promised the affair should be differently conducted. He felt that it was all wrong and acknowledged it. As I prophesied, he sent for Dr. Crane before we had come up with the Indians 20 minutes and he would have given anything for the howitzer. I told him that there must be more courage displayed all around or he would get whipped again. I returned in time to relieve the people here who were in the greatest consternation at my prolonged absence. The whole country is one grand stampede; even in Portland they kept a night watch. There have no doubt been several fights before this, and the steamer that takes this away will no doubt bring us the intelligence from the north as well as the south, of some big fights. With regard to the road from here to Fort Lane, it is quite practicable and will cost no more than the other roads in the territory that have been appropriated for. I shall complete my drawings and report as soon as possible and it will no doubt reach Washington by the middle or last of January. I must close or you will never read this. I hope I shall hear from you.
Hon Joseph Lane,
Washington D.C.
 
P.S. Dec 15th I enclose a hasty map that may be of service to you. I shall get my maps and and report of the road ready by the 1st of January. They will reach Washington about the middle of February. We have had no steamer for more than a month is the reason this letter has not gone off; she is expected in the morning. Please send me one of Preston’s maps as soon as they are out. We have no news of the war since my return. Very severe weather for six weeks back.                                                                                                                                          K.
Lieutenant August V. Kautz, Joseph Lane mss 1835-1906, Lilly Library, Indiana University


     That the Statesman editor was anxious to make the impression on the public mind that the 9th Regiment of Oregon militia, called into the field by Col. Ross, by authority of law, were lawless parties of men acting without authority, is the fact that he represented Capt. Smith of the Regulars as having command, and that the battle was fought by the regulars and two companies of volunteers from the Northern Battalion under command of Capts. Bailey and Gordon, when he must have known that Col. Ross had the command, and consequently must have had with him a portion at least of his regiment. Hear what he says editorially in his paper of Nov. 10th:
     "THE FIGHT SOUTH.--In the most of our edition last week, we gave a brief account of an attack upon the Indian camp in Rogue River, by a party of regulars and volunteers, in which the whites were repulsed, with a loss of three regulars and one volunteer killed, and twenty wounded--four mortally. The volunteer killed was a son of Rev. Jacob Gillespie, a member of the last Assembly from Lane County. He was in Capt. Bailey's company, of that Co., which was in the engagement. It is said no Indian was killed. * * * By dispatches received by us a few hours before news of the attack and repulse came, we learned that the Indians were encamped upon a high mountain, with their women and children, stock and plunder, which was heavy (much having been lately captured from wagons and pack trains); that they were too much encumbered to move readily, and had evidently planted themselves there for a fight. They had fortified so strongly that Capt. Smith, of the regulars, deemed it inadvisable to attack them with rifles, fearing he would be repulsed. His plan was to plant his howitzers upon an eminence three-fourths of a mile distant, commanding their camp, and from which he could throw shell and grape among them--first waiting until a sufficient number of men had arrived to afford three columns, each sufficient to whip the Indians; and stationing them so that the enemy could not make its escape without encountering one of them, he proposed to drive them from their camp and fortifications with the howitzers, and then attack them with rifles.--The attack was made earlier than the above plan could have been perfected, and we are inclined to the opinion that the men became impatient, and made a premature attack, which resulted as Capt. Smith feared. * * * * * The bravery and coolness of Capt. Smith, of the regulars, is spoken of in the highest terms, and he is represented as now having the fullest confidence of both regulars and volunteers. It is said that he held the open field, exposed to the fire of the enemy, and it is thought to be surprising that he escaped unharmed. His men also behaved well."
     In the anxiety of the editor to keep Col. Ross in the background, and to laud Capt. Smith of the regular army, he has allowed himself to be betrayed into the political indiscretion of doing more than justice to the regular troops at the expense of the volunteer force, by bestowing unqualified praise upon them while he attributes the defeat of Captain Smith's well-laid plans to improper conduct on the part of the volunteers.  If the editor of the Statesman was misled by false representations to do an unintentional injustice to the brave volunteers engaged in that hard-fought and bloody battle, more destructive and bloody than the battle of Okee Chobee, in Florida, in proportion to the number in the field, why has he not done them justice in his paper of Saturday last, after having been forced to admit that he has been imposed upon by his southern correspondents.--Why has he not mentioned in terms of commendation the gallantry of Captains Bailey, Breese, Rinearson, Gordon, Williams, Harris and Wilson, all of whom are justly entitled to as much credit as the editor has awarded so willingly to Captain Smith. Everybody on the ground knows that the commander, Col. Ross, was more exposed than Capt. Smith, and if it was "surprising," as alleged by the Statesman, that Capt. Smith escaped unhurt, it is still more "surprising" that Col. Ross was not shot down, and yet there is no mention by the Statesman of his having been on the ground.  It is well known to everybody in Rogue River Valley that Maj. Fitzgerald had no opportunity afforded him while in the valley for a display of his acknowledged gallantry. He was not in the battle of "Grave Creek Hills," being prevented by sickness, but his company was, under command of their orderly, the Lieutenant being left in the rear with the baggage. The company did not distinguish themselves above any one company of volunteers on the ground, and yet hear what is said in the Statesman last Saturday, editorially, of them, while no one of the volunteer companies under command of Col. Ross has ever been complimented with a notice of the fact that they were in the fight:
     "Maj. Fitzgerald's command left here Tuesday morning, en route for the Dalles. The Major and his men have won a high fame south for gallantry and bravery, and the people in that section part with them reluctantly. We noticed that a large share of the men were 'domned furriners'."
 "Speech of Dr. A. G. Henry," December 3, 1855, photocopy in the Rogue River Indian War vertical file, Southern Oregon Historical Society




Lt. Col. Martin
    Comd. Northern Bat. S. Division O.M.V.
    Sir--As your request for the benefit of the Adjt. Gen. came so late after the loss of the journal of my proceedings from the 25th of Oct. to the 7th Dec., I must say that I am unable to make out a full report or anything else that would be in any way satisfactory to the Adjt. General, but at the same time will give you a few of the details entirely from memory & it may be sufficient to answer the purposes of the department.
    Co. D organized at Deer Creek Douglas Co. on the 24th of Oct. of last year & elected officers on the next evening. At 2 o'clock we took up the line of march toward the frontier & camped at the house of I. B. Nichols on Cow Creek, after having traveled 28 miles. The next day we were placed in possession of news that Capt. Smith of the regular army with Col. Ross of the Jackson Co. forces had through their spies discovered the locality of the enemy. We made a forced march during the night through the Canyon & camped at Camp Elliff (rained hard, without tents). The 27th we joined Capt. Smith & Ross at the Grave Creek House & recd. rations from Capt. Smith, which by the by were very acceptable, as we had no commissary or quartermaster to administer to our wants & for which we were under many obligations to him, as the men & horses were both well worn out. Then at 11 o'clock we took up the line of march to Camp Bailey, with an express order for the Capt. to leave with a guide sent to take us to a certain position in the neighborhood of the camp of the Indians, where arriving found to our extreme regret that the Indians had removed their quarters, which rather had the effect of dampening the ardor of a good many who had trudged up the mountain a distance of 12 miles from the camp (Bailey) on foot. But in a few moments after the fog had been cleared up by the winds (weather very cool) cattle were discovered on the mountains, and the men again becoming anxious started at a pace that was altogether unnecessary & placed a great many of them in a situation to be entirely useless during the day. After finding the Indians we were told by them to come on. The result of our search was the battle of the Grave Creek Hills, which lasted two days or a part of two, during which time the men suffered a great deal for the want of water & provisions, a great many being without water 30 hours and provisions for 50.
    After our return from that battle, having three wounded men in charge, we left according to your order of Nov. 2nd for this valley & proceeded to dispose of my men to render the settlements upon the frontier more secure. I placed a detachment of twenty-five men near W. H. Riddle's & twenty in 10 Mile Prairie and 15 near the house of Watson on the North Umpqua, having an eye to grazing for our animals as a matter of economy, during which time orders were received by you for the establishing of winter qtrs. at or near the house of Riddle on Cow Creek, where we commenced the building of such houses as could make us comfortable, but from the scarcity of timber & the extreme poverty of the cattle to assist us in our operations, that the expenses were greater then by far than 'twas my intention to have made them.
    Remaining in our quarters until about the first of Dec., taking an occasional scout, I recd. an order from Adjt. Stratton to proceed immediately to the Little Meadows on Rogue River & having gotten so far as the Canion an expressman came to me with the news that the Indians were killing stock & doing other mischief on the mountains above the valley. I immediately returned & followed on their trail & dividing my company, a part of them came upon the Indians at the ranch of Mr. Brockway & were shooting his stock down in his lot. The three men in the house were relieved, but being so near night that nothing could be done, in the morning we followed them within a few hundred yards of our camp & found that they had left the settlements & crossed the mountains. I sent a detachment of twenty men upon this trail, but the inclemency of the weather & the deep snow that fell during the scout entirely obliterated every mark.
    You will find this very imperfect as regards dates, but so far as facts are related true. You will present my warmest regards to the Adjt. Gen. & also that of the company under my command & are sorry that we have not been the means of more usefulness to our country. You will also receive the same from yourself upon our going out of the service, and with this you will please accept my resignation as Capt. of Co. D, Douglas Co., O.M.V., hoping you will be more successful in your future operations than we have been in ours.
Oregon State Archives, Yakima and Rogue River War, Document File B, Reel 2, Document 508.



    Editor Statesman--About two weeks ago Dr. Ambrose Ambrose sent two Indians of Sam's band to the Meadows, to learn the fate of the prisoners. Their report is that Mrs. Wagoner was killed in the house, Mrs. Haines and child were made prisoners; the former died within two weeks subsequent to their capture; they kept the latter for some two months but upon hearing of the capture and murder of two squaws by the whites, they subjected the child to massacre, also a half breed. The force at the Meadows has been reinforced by 300 Klamaths, making the present force at the Meadows 650. They are well fortified and are ready to fight. They have lost 18 warriors, 6 at Hungry Hill, 9 at Wagoner's ranch, and 3 at Jumpoff Joe.
    They are willing to make a treaty, but it must be upon their own terms.
"Douglas," in "Umpqua Correspondence of the Statesman," Oregon Statesman, Salem, February 26, 1856, page 2

 
     On the evening of the 30th of October, the editor, accompanied by Lieut. A. V. Kautz, 4th Infantry, and their united commands,(4) marched from Fort Lane to join Captain Smith, who had preceded them to the Grave Creek House on the California and Oregon trail, with his dragoons.(5) The editor there also found a force of volunteers, which had been hastily organized from the settlers, under Colonel Ross. At midnight the troops moved, in two divisions by different routes, towards the Indian camp, the location of which had been ascertained by our scouts. The ascent of the mountains was steep and fatiguing, and delays and detentions occurred, to both the regulars and volunteers; and owing to the latter, in the dark and thick forest, taking the wrong trail, both the divisions of the forces came upon the same side, instead of, as intended, opposite sides of the enemy's camp. Detained as the regulars had been, they were further delayed by the execution of the attack by the failure of their allies to come to time and place, and thus it was that the anticipated surprise came to naught, and that daylight broke upon the hills before we struck the Indians--only to find them on the alert and ready for the combat. The first onset of the troops drove the Indians from the crest of the ridge into the cover and shelter of the trees and chaparral of the descending slope. Concealed in this excellent covert and stripped for the fight, they quickly checked our progress by their telling fire, which laid hors de combat a large number of the troops. Shelter and cover was speedily sought in the chaparral, and the fight was continued with ill success to the troops throughout the day. The fire of the Indians told with great effect; wherever a man exposed himself he was dropped with unerring accuracy by an Indian rifle--hitting wherever was seen a head. The regulars and a portion of the volunteers held to their ground and fought as well as was possible against an almost "sight unseen" enemy, and hampered by an enforced resort to Indian methods or tactics, but the far greater portion of our redoubtable allies abandoned the field and left us alone in our glory of action. Just before nightfall the command withdrew to the base of the hill, where there was a fine spring of water, and after a scanty repast sought rest and slumber on the cold, hard ground. We had scarcely partaken of our meager breakfast early the next morning (November 1) when the Indians, whilst their women and children were seeking safety by moving to another rancheria, made a descent upon us, and were received by our pickets with a desultory fire. The camp thus aroused, the editor moved from the campfire and deployed his detachment for the fight; and whilst under the partial cover of a low bush, he saw the smoke of a rifle emerge from the crotch of a tree a little higher up the ascent, and felt something with a dull thud penetrate his right leg. Springing to his feet from the ground on which he sat, the editor limped to the campfire where our amateur surgeon was kindly caring for the wounded, and presented himself for examination. The surgeon quickly ripped the clothing apart, examined and dressed the wound, which was found to be through the right thigh, barely escaping the femoral artery. The conflict lasted several hours, and the Indians, towards noon, withdrew to join their women and children. In the two days of conflict the Indian loss was small, but the whites suffered heavily; the writer does not remember the total loss, but that in his own detachment was five (or more) killed and wounded--out of thirty-five. Late in the afternoon, the troops moved towards the settlements, the wounded being carried on horses and mules, and made as comfortable as possible. The steep, rough descent of the trail of fifteen miles--ofttimes a narrow path along an abrupt hillside, or lined with a tangled chaparral, with which the wounded came constantly in contact--made the march a very painful one to all, as some of the wounded could not restrain the outcries provoked by their sufferings from this cause and from their wounds. After midnight we reached the Grave Creek House, where we found the surgeon from Fort Lane, Dr. Charles H. Crane(6), who took charge of the wounded, and to his kind and skillful care (then and later on) the editor is indebted for his speedy recovery from the effects of his wound. The wounded were carried in wagons to Fort Lane or to their homes in the vicinity.
(4) Detachment of Company H, 3rd Artillery, under this officer, which had just arrived from Fort Orford; en route it had been attacked by these Indians just after they started on the warpath, and Kautz, in the engagement was struck in the breast by a Minie ball [sic] and escaped injury or death by its hitting his memorandum book, in which he kept his daily journal or diary--a habit of many years, if not of his life. Kautz was afterward a Brigadier-General in the late war, and is now Colonel 8th Infantry, and Brevet Major-General.
(5) Troops C and E, 1st Dragoons--the garrison of Fort Lane; the latter commanded by Lieut. Benj. Allston, its captain, Brevet Major E. H. Fitzgerald, being left sick at Fort Lane.
(6) Afterwards Surgeon-General in the Army, and now deceased [1825-1883].
   
Horatio Gates Gibson, originally printed in the Army and Navy Journal sometime after 1884, transcribed from a reprint in the collections of the U.S. Military Academy Library, West Point. Serialized in the Medford Mail Tribune April 13 (page B1), April 27 (page B1) and May 4, 1930 (page B5). The beginning of the article can be found transcribed here.

 
     Lieutenant Kautz, 4th Infantry, had left Fort Orford with a detachment of ten men to reconnoiter a road from Fort Orford to Fort Lane. Ignorant of the existing war, he came suddenly upon an encampment of Indians on the dividing ridge between Cow Creek and Grave Creek. The movements of the Indians were hostile, and he prepared for an attack. The Indians fired first, and the fire was returned. The skirmish lasted for half an hour, when the Indians succeeded in flanking his party and bringing down the Lieutenant and two of his men. A panic seized the rest and they fled. The two men were killed instantly; the Lieutenant escaped with a slight wound, the ball having been prevented from taking effect by a memorandum book in a pocket on his right side. Unable to rally his men, they retreated and made their escape with the loss of all their mules and everything except their arms and the notes of the reconnaissance.  They reached Harkness' station, on the Oregon road, twelve miles distant, at two o'clock at night. He sent an express to Major Fitzgerald, who was then stationed at Evans' Ferry, twenty miles distant. He arrived that evening. On the 27th they went upon the ground where Lieutenant Kautz had fallen in with them. The Indians had removed their camp along the ridge about three miles. The bodies of the two men were found scalped and mangled, and were buried by the troops. The camp which the Indians had given up indicated that they had been collected in considerable numbers and in a very favorable position for defense, and the Major decided that he would not attack them, as his command of seventy men was not considered large enough for a complete success, the desire being to overthrow the Indians at a blow.  Captain Smith arrived at Harkness' station on the evening of the 27th, and took command. Major Fitzgerald returned to Fort Lane sick, as his constitution is very feeble. Information was sent to all the volunteers in the valley, and Captain Smith concentrated all his regular force, amounting in all to about one hundred and thirty regular troops. Colonel Ross arrived on the evening of the 30th, increasing the united forces of regulars and volunteers to near four hundred. A plan of battle was decided upon to attack the Indians on four sides, and on the night of the 30th, about 12 o'clock, they all moved. They came upon the old camp where Lieutenant Kautz had met the Indians, and three of the parties found themselves together. It was now daylight, but not too late, however, to separate the commands. But the guide having pointed out the position of the Indians, the officers in command decided that there were no Indians. The guide insisted that they were there and that it was necessary to move immediately. Still they delayed, although one party had gone to the westward, and it was necessary that the other three should cooperate. It was a cold, foggy morning, and the men built fires. No sooner had the smoke begun to ascend than the opposite hill was alive with Indians, collecting their stock and preparing for an attack. The volunteers, with their usual disregard of order, set out down into the gulch that intervened and up the opposite side, instead of continuing along the ridge, which made quite a bend. It was fifteen hundred feet down and as many up again. The guide proposed to Capt. Smith to keep on the ridge, but he followed the volunteers, and they were completely worn out when they came upon the Indians.  The attack was made on the east side along the ridge, and the other party having come in on the south side, the Indians gave up their camp upon a knoll and having sent their women and children with their stock along the ridge to the westward, they defended their retreat by taking up a position just over the next kink in the ridge, where they could command the knoll they had abandoned. The south side of the ridge was covered with heavy timber and dense undergrowth. The ardor of the volunteers was checked by seeing two or three of their companions fall. There was no order or system in the attack; the troops were mixed up without regard to corps or companies; the officers did not pretend to exercise any control, and a system of skirmishing was kept up by about thirty volunteers and as many regulars for several hours without making any advance upon the Indians; the others were behind, and it was in vain that those in advance called upon those in the rear to come on. Some of the volunteers actually left the field in the first onset, and never returned. Capt. Smith tried to get up several charges, but as he did not lead them himself, and that alley were in reality impracticable from the thickness of the brush, as an Indian could fire twice before the party making a charge could advance fifty yards; and even if the Indian was routed out of his position, he had only to retreat a few yards and his position was as good as the one he abandoned, and so for almost any distance. The regulars lost two men and six wounded in these charges. Having marched all night and fought all morning, without breakfast and without water, by noon even the few who did fight in this disorderly engagement were worn out, and gradually hauled off, and only random shots were exchanged during the afternoon. The train had been left some three miles back with three days' provisions on the old camp ground of the Indians, but no arrangement being made to bring up the train, they had to camp that night without provisions, and for the sake of water they moved off into a little gulch, and left the battlefield to the Indians.  The night was cold and wet, and with nothing to refresh them but the water from the dirty little spring, and little brush fires, it seemed interminably long, for it was impossible to sleep, the sides of the gulch being so steep that the men with difficulty could get a foothold. The camp had nothing to recommend it but the water, and almost everyone felt that an attack during night would prove very fatal. So strong did this feeling prevail that about eight or nine o'clock in the night a sentinel with his revolver cocked, either in the tremor of the cold or his own fears, pulled the trigger too hard--it went off, the report created a general stampede and sound that [men] scrambled over the wounded regardless of their shrieks; a dreamy volunteer thus suddenly disturbed snatched a gun; it proved to be a musketoon with a ball and three buckshot; and he fired at what his imagination conceived to be the foe, and succeeded in inflicting a very respectable wound each on three of his volunteer companions. Order was restored and nothing more transpired that night.  But at daylight the next morning the Indians made an attack on the whites, and for two hours a fire was kept up, wherein the loss of the whites was but light--Lieut. Gibson, 3rd Artillery, was wounded; the loss of the Indians was greater, but probably not over two killed or wounded. The arrival of a large company of volunteers, mounted, from the Willamette Valley, compelled the Indians to retire. The wounded were then put on litters or on horseback and between twelve and one they left that ill-fought field to the Indians and reached Harkness' station on the morning of the 2nd of November, between two and three o'clock, not having eaten or slept since they left it on the night of the 30th. The whites lost in all ten killed and twenty-seven wounded. Two of those killed were shot by our own men, and a third killed himself. Two others, besides the three wounded in the night stampede, were also wounded by our own men, and the surgeons who have attended the wounded gave it as their opinion that many more of the wounded were sufferers in the same way. The regulars and volunteers were to organize again about the 9th for another fight. They may find the Indians and they may not; at any rate, they will be more difficult to conquer now than then, and it is not difficult to predict a second defeat. It is not thought that there is any combination between the Rogue River Indians and those on the east side of the Cascade Range.  The Indian force in the above engagement is variously estimated from seventy to one hundred and fifty.                                                                                                               U.S.
"Our California Correspondence," New York Herald, January 31, 1856, page 3


    At Crescent City, Gen. Wool received a letter from Lieut. Kautz, fourth infantry, who had just arrived from Fort Lane, informing him of the combats on the 31st ult. and 1st inst., in the canyon between Umpqua and Rogue River valleys, in both of which Lieut. Kautz was engaged. His letter states that after two days fighting, the whites had retired with the intention of renewing the attack on the 9th last. The troops engaged on these days, from all the information we can get, were a portion of our company of dragoons, with a number of volunteers from Rogue River Valley, numbering in all nearly three hundred, of whom Lieut. Kautz says ten were killed and twenty-seven wounded. The Indians were very strongly posted on high rocky ground almost inaccessible except by a path known only to themselves, and the whites it seems, only withdrew for the purpose of bringing up a howitzer and making such disposition as should diminish the advantages of the Indian position.
"The Indian War," Daily Whig, Troy, New York, January 16, 1856, page 2
 
 

	Hawkins Shelton	Wounded slightly
	James. M. Fordice	do. severely
	William Wilson	do.

    I had barely arrived at Eugene City and visited my father, mother, brothers and sisters on our prairie home, when news of the outbreak followed me. A mass meeting was called. The first company was raised at that meeting, I volunteering among the number. Joe Bailey was elected captain, and we were very soon on the march to the scene of action.  Now, after this brief preliminary digression, I come back to my position in the captain's mess. Our journey to the great canyon was brief and without incident worthy of remark; but the dark, rainy night in which we passed through that canyon was an occasion not soon to be forgotten by the survivors of the raw recruits who, with hearts fired with a determination to rescue the settlers beyond or perish with them, made that irregular march through that hole in the wall without light and in a drenching rain, guided only by the sound of voices, and the projecting cliffs, which kept us from turning to the right or the left only as the road itself happened to turn that way.  Just at the break of day we reached the Cow Creek Valley, wet, muddy, weary, hungry; but with very little delay for rest and refreshment we hurried on, and the first few miles of our march the next day began to show us evidence of the deadly raid. Smoke was yet ascending from the houses and barns which had been burned by the copper-colored devils, stock lay along the roadside with bullet holes through their swelling bodies, ruthlessly shot by the marauders because they could not drive it all away with them, and before we left Cow Creek we came to the spot where the captain's brother, Hal Bailey, had been murdered and mutilated. I plainly saw the stains of his blood on the roadside.  Reaching the "Six-Bit House," where I had stayed overnight on my way home a few days previous, we found it intact and well defended. Here we made headquarters, from whence, on the following day, we commenced an active campaign against the notorious John who, we learned, was then in camp only fifteen miles away. Learning that Captain Smith, of the regular army, with 100 men, was already on his path, we lost no time, and after coffee and biscuit baked in fry pans we continued our line of march by the pale light of the stars, for it did not happen to be full moon, and early in the morning we overtook Captain Smith, who afterwards became famous in the War of the Rebellion, and about one hour after sunrise

    Alex A. King died nine miles east of Eugene Saturday morning, of paralysis. Mr. King was born in Lafayette County, Mo., June 15, 1829. He left the land of his birth to cross the plains in 1851, and settled in Lane County November 15, 1851. His first settlement was made near Pleasant Hill, but subsequently he roamed from place to place, in the meantime serving in the Rogue River Indian War. After the battle of Conger Hill [sic--Hungry Hill], with much fatigue and many narrow escapes, he rescued the body of Mr. Gillespie, who was killed in the fight.
Oregonian, Portland, November 4, 1895, page 3

    Ex-County Judge John C. Summer died at his home at Prineville Wednesday. Judge Summer was born in Indiana, September 1, 1883. When a boy he moved with his parents to Arkansas. In 1853 he emigrated to Oregon, settling in Lane County. He was a volunteer in the Rogue River Indian War, and was wounded in the battle of Hungry Hill. In 1859 he moved to Linn County, and was elected as a member of the legislature from that county in 1876. He moved to Crook County in 1893. In 1880 he was appointed county judge of Crook County and was elected to that office in 1890, serving to 1894. He left a widow and four children.
Eugene Guard, July 20, 1901, page 4


    Ex-County Judge John C. Summer, who died at Prineville last week, was an early pioneer of Rogue River Valley and was wounded in the famous fight with Indians known as the battle of Hungry Hill.
Valley Record, Ashland, Oregon, July 25, 1901, page 3

Evening Capital News, Boise, Idaho, February 13, 1909, page B1  Also printed in the Rogue River Courier, Grants Pass, March 12, 1909, page 6


    We went on to Wolf Creek, a distance of 160 miles from Eugene City. There we found Captain Smith, from Southern Oregon. These companies combined made up a little army of 400 men. When we reached Wolf Creek, we learned that about 500 Indians were camped 50 miles from Wolf Creek, on the high mountains, between Rogue River and Cow Creek. This was the report of scouts that had located them three days before, and every one of us, to the man, was in favor of punishing the marauders as quickly as possible.
    Major Ross, who had taken command, got the officers together and held a council of war. It was decided to make a forced march by night, on foot, as it was impossible to use horses in such a rough, ragged country. Everyone was excited, and anxious, to get into a fight with the Indians, and it was overenthusiasm that caused our downfall.
    We stayed in camp till after dark, and then started for the Indians. Our progress was slow, on account of steep mountains, and we didn't reach the place where the Indians had been camped till about eight o'clock the next morning; instead of reaching it in the early morning hours. When we did reach the place, to our chagrin, the birds had flown, and as we read the signs they had left about two days before. Now we were puzzled--we didn't know which way the Indians had gone, and we failed to take the precaution we should have.
    The men, as a whole, were ignorant of Indian ways, and their only thought was to follow the Indians. They started out, going in all directions, and there wasn't an officer that had ten men with him
    During all the confusion, I looked the country over, and decided which way the Indians were the most likely to go. I knew that they wouldn't all leave their camp together, that they would scatter and come together at some certain point. I had fixed the I designated point on a ridge, between two deep canyons, and on reaching the ridge we found the trail.
    I had six of my men with me, and we were at least a quarter of a mile in advance of the main army. I looked across the canyon to my left, and saw some Indians on the next ridge. We passed the word back to the main army, and it soon came up to where we were.
    It was about three quarters of a mile, air line, across to where the Indians were, but we had to go about three miles to get where they were. When the main army found out the location of the Indians, they threw caution to the winds, and started for them..
    My men were in advance of the main army, and we saw about 40 Indians come out on a little open place, out of gunshot from us, and dance the war dance. The temptation was too great, and we opened fire, of course, without any effect, and.they gave us the horse laugh and disappeared over a little knoll.
    Now take it from me, those redskins knew their music, for we naturally thought we had those fellows on the run, and we had an idea that we could outrun 'em. We started after them, on the double quick, but they had just outsmarted us. We ran right into their trap, for the first thing we knew, we were right up against their fortification, located in the thick brush at the foot of the mountain. As soon as we were in range of their guns, they gave us the best they had. Two of our men fell, one mortally wounded, and the other lived to get well.
    As soon as the firing began, our men were thrown in a worse state of confusion than they were before, if it were possible. We moved the wounded men to the rear, and then began one of the most disgraceful imitations of.a battle that was ever witnessed.
    The regular soldiers and the volunteers were shouting, "Where are the Indians," and the Indians answered their question for them, by pouring another volley into their ranks. Several men fell, and then it was every man for himself. They rushed into the brush, and shot at random, sometimes shooting at one another, with the assumption that wherever they saw the brush move, there was an Indian.
    During the confusion, I took advantage of the occasion to do some reconnoitering. I was hidden in the brush and timber, about 600 feet above the battleground, and could tell from the report of the guns what was going on. Occasionally I would see one of our men, and sometimes an Indian. There wasn't any chance of getting a clear view of the battle on account of the thickness of
the brush.
    I moved along the entire length of the battle line, and could get a fairly good idea of what was happening to our men, from one and of the battle line to the other--end what I saw could hardly be described as a battle, for it was every fellow for himself, and the Indians take the hindmost, for the Indians were securely
fortified behind their breastworks.
    After taking in the situation as well as I could, I returned to where our dead and wounded were, and I found nineteen dead and wounded. While I was reconnoitering,.l could plainly see what should be done, but it was impossible, for I didn't know where any of the officers were, except that they were in the brush, and had no control over their men. It was evident that the only key to win the battle was to form the men in a line and charge the Indians, but the steepness of the mountain, and the brush, made that impossible.
    I decided to scout around the mountainside and examine the lay of the country, and find out if there was any advantage to be gained by shifting our army to another position.
    On coming to the Rogue River side of the mountain, I descended the mountain and came to a little creek, near the Indians' fortifications. I crawled along the bank of the creek till I was within three hundred yards of their stronghold. 1 could see a good many Indians, and got a good view of the squaw, Sally Lane, daughter of Chief Joseph Lane, council chief of the Rogue River Indians..
    Sally was located six or seven hundred yards up their mountainside, out of range of our old muzzle-loading rifles. She was sitting on a horse, directing the Indians, as she could see the movement of our soldiers (as well as the brush would permit), shouting her orders with a voice equal to the sound of a foghorn. She was no amateur directing her warriors.
    This lady got the name Sally Lane in 1850, when General Joseph Lane made a treaty with the Rogue River Indians, and in honor of General Lane, her father was named Chief Joseph, and she Sally Lane. I watched lady Sally giving directions to her soldiers long enough to get the location of her warriors, and then worked my way back to where our men were located.
    When I got back, the number of wounded and dead had increased to thirty. At this time Captain came out of the brush, with eighteen men he had succeeded in getting together, and proposed to me that we go down below, where the Indians were, on the creek. We were to follow up the creek, to where the Indians were fortified, end I told him that I had investigated that part of the battleground very carefully, and how I found the Indians located. I told him that it looked to be impossible to accomplish anything from that source, and that we would surely lose more men; but he insisted.
    We tried out his plan, and when we got within gunshot of the Indians that were secreted in the brush, all of a sudden--BANG! went the Indians' guns, and three of our men fell, badly wounded. We caught up the wounded and carried them to where the other wounded men were.
    By this time it was growing late, and the men were coming from the battlefield. They brought the news that three of Captain Smith's men were dead, out on the field, and the Captain detailed a corporal, with six men, to do and bring them in.
    The Indians paid no attention to them till they went to lift the dead, and then they opened fire upon them, and two fell, wounded, and the lucky ones picked up the wounded, and carried them back to where the army was.
    When Captain Smith detailed twelve men to go and get the bodies, and they were met with the same result as the first, on1y worse, for three were wounded, and one killed. Then the Captain gave up the idea of getting the dead, and we had to retreat about one-half mile downhill to a little creek, where we could get water. Besides the three soldiers we left four dead volunteers on the battlefield.
    The next morning at daylight, the Indians attacked us in our camp, and fought us till noon, but this time we had the advantage of them, for we were concealed in the brush, and they were more or less in the open, and had to do the moving.
    During this last fight, there were no casualties on our side, and we never knew whether or not there were any Indians killed during the two fights. Our loss was twenty-three dead, and forty wounded. After the Indians retired, we buried our dead, and made litters on which to carry our wounded, and went to Wolf Creek,
where we left our supplies. We called the battle we had fought with the Indians the Battle of Hungry Hill, for we didn't have a mouthful of anything to eat from the time we left our supplies on Wolf Creek, till we got tack.
    Eight days after the Battle of Hungry Hill, Captain Bailey and I went to the battleground and buried those that were left on the battlefield,.in one grave. Of those that were wounded, four of them succumbed to their wounds.
    I have never seen a detailed account of the Battle of Hungry Hill, although it is mentioned in the history of Indian wars as the Battle of Hungry Hill. It seems that all the officers that were engaged in the battle were, like myself, ashamed to give the details of the battle.
    From Wolf Creek, we volunteers disbanded to our several homes with the stigma of defeat written all over our physiognomies. After resting up for a few days, eighteen of us volunteers were detailed to patrol the Oregon and California road, from one road station to another. I continued this patrol duty well into late December, and then answered a call from the quartermaster, I. N. Smith, to come to Corvallis and serve as purchasing agent for the southern division of the War Department.
    I served as purchasing agent in the quartermaster's department till the war closed in June, when the Indians were moved to the Grand Ronde Indian Reservation, in Yamhill County. At that time, I returned to my ranch and remained on it until 1859, and continued to raise cattle.
Cyrenius Mulkey, "One of the Bravest," unpublished typescript, Oregon Historical Society Research Library Mss. 981


    We passed through the canyon and went into camp together near the other end. During the night volunteer stragglers, and soon organized bodies, made their appearance; they reported that ammunition and supplies had given out, and that the regulars also had drawn back to Grave Creek, a short distance from our camp on the road to Fort Lane. I consulted with Major M. at once, and we agreed that the best thing to do was for him to start at daylight with his companies and join Captain Smith to arrange with him as to future movements. My train was ready to start at early dawn; but seeing no movement in the volunteer camp, I went to it and found that the men were asleep, and that the cooks were just beginning to bake beans for breakfast. Going to the major, I urged that the regulars would probably make an early start for Fort Lane, and that if we delayed for the lengthy operation of baking beans we might miss seeing Captain Smith. He agreed, and suggested to the cooks that beans were hardly a necessity for breakfast. The one who seemed to be in charge, a tall, lank man, placing his hand upon his stomach, replied gravely: "Major, when I'm going into battle I likes to have my belly full of beans." There was nothing more to be said, and we waited for the beans. The two companies were provided with horses and, when the time at last came for mounting, the animals were drawn up in one rank and the men tried to mount in the narrow spaces between them. As they found no little difficulty in so doing, I explained to the major how it is done in the service by leading the even numbers slightly to the front. He was so pleased at the suggestion that he gave the men a drill in mounting and dismounting. Then he made them a little speech. Finally we started, my broken-down animals suffering from the long wait under their packs. When we came in sight of the regular camp near Grave Creek, I rode ahead and explained our situation to the commander, Captain Smith; he at once ordered an escort of thirty-five men for my party, and they reported so promptly that the head of the train never halted. This was my first experience with volunteer troops, and it impressed me not a little. The men were brave and interested, and the officers were willing and eager to assist us, but total lack of military training made them slow and ineffective in emergencies. The contrast between them and the regulars was striking. The latter were encamped at a little stockade; they had had a sharp fight in the mountains a little south of us, and were drawing back to Fort Lane for supplies of ammunition, which had given out. They had had several men killed and wounded, and among the latter was Lieutenant Gibson, formerly of our escort, who had joined in time to take part in the affair.
Henry L. Abbot, "Reminiscences of the Oregon War of 1855," Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, Volume XLV 1909, pages 436-442


    Right there was where the officers made their great mistake. It was like this: When we arrived on the ground where we had expected to find the Indians, we all mixed up and went to hunting for the trail. There was not an officer who had ten men of his company under command. We all scattered in every direction, looking for the Indian trail. I took a look at the country and made up my mind which way they were the most likely to have gone, and then started in that direction, hunting for their trail. The whole army finally followed after me. I had six of my men with me, and were about a quarter of a mile in the lead of the main army. I was traveling up a sharp ridge between the deep canyons and had found the Indian trail where they had all come together.
    Indians, in such cases as this, never leave their camp in a body, but scatter so as not to make any more signs than they can help. They know the country and have a certain place for all to get together again. I looked across the canyon to my left and saw the Indians on the next ridge. On an air line the ridge was about three-quarters of a mile distant, but we had to travel about three miles to get across the canyon. We passed the word back to the men and showed them where the Indians were. Then all hands made a run for the Indians, myself and party being in the lead. We were the first to reach them, and we opened the battle before we got within gunshot of their fortifications. There were about forty young bucks came out from their fortification and danced a war dance; as we advanced nearer to them they retreated just over a little "sugarloaf" mound and disappeared. This was done to deceive us, which it did. We went direct to where we had seen them last, which was within gunshot of their fortifications. The fortification was located in a very steep, heavily brushed canyon. The timber and brush were so thick you could not see an Indian or anything else in it.
    At this place there was a kind of bench formed on the "backbone" of the mountain, and there were two creeks heading in this flat, one of which flowed in a southerly direction into Grave Creek and the other north into Cow Creek. The main fortification was right at the foot of the steep mountain and at the edge of the little flat, and a little way down the creek, which flowed north. When we got to where we had last seen the Indians, we, of course, looked around to see what had become of them. In less than a minute there was about twenty shots fired at us, and two of my men fell badly wounded. (One of them, John Gillespie, died in a few minutes. The other man got well.) In an instant after the shooting I told my men to take the wounded men out of sight of the Indians, and they only had to move them about twenty steps until they were entirely hidden from the Indians.
    At this time up came the whole army, and they were in about the greatest state of confusion that I have ever seen a company of men in my whole life. Everybody for himself, and everybody howling, "Where are the Indians?" I showed them, and over into the brush and timber they went. However, they called a halt very soon after passing this little knoll, for the Indians opened fire on them as fast as they came in sight. There were between four and five hundred of the warriors behind their fortification. Our men soon found out how the Indians were situated, but it was impossible for a few men to run them out of their fortification. Then our men were so badly scattered that it was impossible to get enough of them together to charge the fortification. So the fight went on all day in the same way. Just as soon as I got my wounded men taken care of, I returned to the battleground. My other four men had already returned, so I went alone, but did not get right into the hard fighting. I could see from the smoke and the report from the Indians' guns about how they were located. I was hid in the brush and timber on a raise which was about five or six hundred feet above the battleground [Mulkey must mean five or six hundred feet away and higher in elevation] and could tell from the report of both the Indians' and our men's guns about what was going on. Occasionally I would see a man, but the brush and timber was so thick that I saw very few of either. I kept moving along until I had traveled the whole length of the battle line. I was taking observations and I do not think that anyone ever saw a battle fought at such a disadvantage as this one was. Here was four hundred of our men scattered all over the battleground in this thick woods, and every man for himself in the brush where they could not see each other, in many cases not more than twenty feet distant. What made it worse, they were shooting at every bush that happened to move by either Indian or white man, so you can see that in many cases our men were shooting at each other.
    After taking in the situation as well as I could, I returned to where our dead and wounded were located. I found nineteen dead and wounded who had been carried off the battlefield while I had been away. I knew what should be done, but it was impossible for me to do it. You see that I did not know where a single one of the officers were except that they were on the battlefield, but there was not a one of them who had any control over his men. It was a singlehanded and everybody-for-himself fight. I could see that there was but one possible way to win the fight, and that was to call all of our forces off and collect them together as best we could, then make a general charge. Even then it [was] almost impossible to get them all together. The mountain was so steep, and the brush and timber so thick, that it was impossible to line the men up in shape to make a charge. I decided to make a trip to the opposite side of the mountain, which was the Rogue River side. As I have told you there were two small creeks heading near the Indians' fortification, one flowing north into Cow Creek and the other flowing south into Grave Creek, which was a tributary of the Rogue River. I took the Rogue River side and came to the creek, I should think, about two hundred and fifty yards below the Indians' fortification. I then crawled along up the creek through the brush until I was within a distance of about one hundred and fifty yards of where the Indians were. I was near enough so that I stole two of their horses. I could see a good many Indians and got a good view of the squaw, Sally Lane, who was commanding the battle. She was located upon the mountainside about six or seven hundred yards and out of range of our muzzle-loading rifles, and at an elevation of six or eight hundred feet above the battleground, and had the fortification between us and her. The place where she was stationed, on the mountainside, was not very busy, there being quite a space of open ground. The squaw was on horseback, and was giving directions to the Indians. Her position was such that she had a full view of both Indians and volunteers. I have never seen but one other person who had as powerful [a voice] as had Sally Lane, and that was her father, Chief Joseph Lane, who was the main council chief of the Rogue River Indians, the same people we were fighting. I could hear her at that distance just as clear and distinct as though we were very near her.
    This is how she got the name of Sally Lane: In 1850 when General Joseph Lane made the first treaty with the Rogue River Indian tribe, in honor of General Lane, we christened her father "Joe Lane," and herself "Sally Lane." She was a large, stout woman, and had a voice like a man, only more so. I remained in hiding where I was for about one hour, I think, watching Sally and her warriors. While I was lying there hid in the brush, I discovered two horses near me. They had long ropes on, so I decided to take them to camp with me. I crawled up until I got hold of their ropes. I went out to the end of the ropes and pulled, moving the horses very slowly until they came close to me. I would then go out to the end of the rope and proceed as before. In this way I got out of danger. I then got one of the horses and led the other until I reached the place where our dead and wounded were. When I got there I found about thirty dead and wounded, who had been carried off from the battlefield.
    About this time Captain Bailey came out of the brush with eighteen of our men who had got together, and he proposed to me that we go down below where the Indians were located on the Cow Creek side, and then follow up the creek to where they were, which would partially place us on the Indians' side of their fortification. I told Mr. Bailey that I had investigated that part of the battleground very carefully, and told him as nearly as I could just how the situation was. I also told him at this time that I did not think we could accomplish anything in that way, and that I felt sure we would lose some more of our men. However, he insisted and we went. We got within gunshot of the Indians without seeing them until they opened fire on us, and three of our men fell badly wounded. We grabbed up the wounded men and retreated back the way we had come, to where our dead and wounded were.
    By this time it was growing late in the evening, and our men were all leaving the battleground and coming where we had left the dead and wounded. We had to retreat about a half mile into a very steep canyon where we could get water. About the time we were getting ready to start, some of the men who had come in from the battlefield told Captain Smith that there were three of his men who had been killed and were lying at a certain place yet uncared for, so Captain Smith detailed a corporal with six men to go and get them. The Indians did not pay any attention to them until they went to move the dead bodies, at which time they opened fire on the soldiers and wounded two of them. The other soldiers then grabbed up the wounded men and retreated back where we were. Captain Smith then detailed twelve men and sent them to get the bodies. They met with [the] same defeat, only they had three men wounded and one killed. The Captain then gave up trying to get his men and went into camp, leaving the dead on the battleground. Besides the three soldiers we left four volunteers dead on the battlefield. These seven men were left on that battleground for eight days before they were buried. I and Captain Bailey went back eight days afterwards and buried them all in one grave.
    We went into camp with twenty-three dead and forty-odd wounded. The next morning at daylight the Indians attacked us in our camp and fought us until noon, but they soon found out that we had the best of it as we were hid in the brush and they were doing the moving, which gave us a great advantage over them. About noon they withdrew to their fortification where we had fought them the day before. We then buried our dead, made litters on which to carry our wounded and went to Wolf Creek, where we had left our supplies.
    We buried twenty-seven men who were killed in this battle of "Hungry Hill." We named it Hungry Hill for the reason that we did not have a mouthful of food all the time we were there. Besides the twenty-seven men who were killed, we carried to our camp on Wolf Creek some forty-odd who had been wounded on the battlefield. There were five of these wounded men who died afterwards.
    I have never seen a detailed account of this battle in print. Not even in the history of the Indian wars of Oregon, which only speak of it as the battle of Hungry Hill. I think that all of the officers were like myself ashamed to give the battle in detail. After resting up for two or three days I took eighteen of my men and patrolled the road from Wolf Creek to Hardy Elliff's road house, which was situated at the head of Cow Creek, a distance of eighteen miles. This patrol was to guard the Oregon and California travel from one stage station to another. I continued this until in December, at which time I got a dispatch from the quartermaster, I. N. Smith, asking me to come to Corvallis. Mr. Smith sent word that he wanted me in his office to act as purchasing agent for his department.
    I left my command and went to Corvallis, and worked in the Quartermaster's Department until the war was closed in June. After the war was closed the Indians were all moved from this country to Grand Ronde Reservation in Yamhill County. I then returned to my ranch and remained on it until the summer of 1859. The cattle business got rather dull in Oregon, so I concluded to drive my cattle to California, close them out and quit the business.
Cyrenius Mulkey, "Eighty-One Years of Frontier Life," unpublished typescript written circa 1913, Oregon Historical Society Research Library Mss. 981




    The volunteers found a large number of Indians on Bald Peak, a high mountain which is near Grave Creek. The Indians retired into the brush, whence they poured a deadly fire into the ranks of the soldiers. All day long the battle continued, and at dark the whites retired a short distance to obtain water for their wounded and dying. The next morning the Indians made a desperate attack, but were forced to retire to the brush. Nevertheless, "they retained a good position on the battleground and held their scalp dance to celebrate the victory. But the victory was dearly purchased, inasmuch as the Indians not only failed to pursue the retreating whites, but left immediately for their stronghold down the Rogue River."
J. B. Horner, "Rogue River Reds Fight Five Years Before Yielding," Oregon Sunday Journal, May 23, 1920, page 18   Horner was a professor of history at Oregon Agricultural College.


    Brig. Gen. Horatio Gates Gibson, United States army veteran of the war with Mexico, Indian campaigns and the Civil War, who died yesterday, was the oldest living graduate of West Point. . . . The general bore only one scar--in his thigh--from an Indian's bullet, in what the soldiers called the "Battle of Hungry Hill," along the Rogue River in Oregon.
"Veteran of Many Fights," Kansas City Star, April 18, 1924, page 8


    "My father [Richard Yates Rush] served in the Rogue River Indian war in Company A of the First Battalion, Second Regiment, Oregon Mounted Volunteers. He was mustered into the service October 23, 1855, and discharged February 6, 1856. Joseph Bailey was captain of the company and D. W. Keith and Cy Mulkey were lieutenants. My father was in the fight at the Grave Creek Hills, south of Cow Creek. Captain Smith of the regular army, who was captain of the First Dragoons, was in charge at that battle. In addition to the volunteer troops under Colonel Ross and the regulars under Captain Smith, there were two companies of the battalion that had been called out by Governor Curry. The company my father was in was commanded by Captain Bailey, and the other company was under Captain Samuel Gordon. The battle started by the troops charging the Indians, who were on a hill. The Indians were supposed to be surprised, but they seemed to know all about it and took shelter behind trees and returned the fire, so the battle was postponed till the next day. The troops spent most of the next day trying to drive the Indians from their stronghold, but finally retired and camped at Bloody Spring. The next morning the Indians attacked the troops. The soldiers marched to Fort Bailey, on Grave Creek. The volunteers had 26 men killed, wounded and missing. In my father's company John Gillespie was killed and five men were wounded."
Gabriel Preston Rush, quoted by Fred Lockley, "Impressions and Observations of the Journal Man," Oregon Journal, Portland, October 16, 1925, page 18  Two Rushes appear on Captain Bailey's muster roll, but only Richard Yates Rush was mustered in on October 23, 1855.


    "In 1855 I enlisted in Captain Joseph Bailey's company for the Rogue River war. From Eugene we went to the Six-Bit House, and from there on south, where we fought the battle of Hungry Hill. The regulars and the volunteers were in the Cow Creek and Grave Creek country and were about to attack the Indians when our company and a company commanded by Samuel Gordon arrived. They assigned our two companies the job of going around the edge of the hill to the north to get the Indians when Captain Rinearson and Captain Welton charged the Indians' position and drove them out. The Indians, however, refused to be driven out. Captain Smith, with his dragoons, charged the Indians, but was unable to dislodge them, and some of the regulars were killed. At dark the troops went into camp at Bloody Spring and next morning at sunrise the Indians attacked us. This was called the battle of Hungry Hill. The volunteers lost 26 men in killed, wounded and missing. John Gillespie of our company was killed and John Walden, John Richardson, Jim Laphar, Tom Aubrey and John Pankey were wounded. We followed the Indians to the Meadows and our spies reported the Indians on the opposite side of the river. We fixed up a raft to cross, but the Indians, hidden in the brush on the other side, fired at the men launching the raft, so we withdrew. I served 3 months and 14 days."
Oliver H. P. Beagle, quoted by Fred Lockley, "Impressions and Observations of the Journal Man," Oregon Journal, Portland, July 13, 1927, page 10


    Commodore [Stephen] Jackson was married at Roseburg in 1895 to Lillian Bailey, whose people were pioneers of Douglas County. She was a daughter of John Bailey, whose uncle, Ezekiel Bailey, was killed by Indians in the Rogue River war. Another of her father's uncles, Holland Bailey, was killed and four others wounded October 23, 1855. Her uncle Joseph Bailey was a captain in the Rogue River war. At the battle of Bloody Spring the Indians attacked the regulars and volunteers and killed 26 men. Of these, John Gillespie of Captain Bailey's company was killed, and John Walden, J. C. Richardson, James Laphar, John Pankey and T. J. Aubrey were wounded. After defeating the troops the Indians [sic] retreated to Fort Bailey, on Grave Creek, carrying their wounded on litters. Joseph Bailey was in command of Company A, of which Cyrenius Mulkey was second lieutenant. Many years ago Mulkey, then an inmate of the Soldiers Home at Roseburg, gave me a graphic account [above] of this battle.
Fred Lockley, "Impressions and Observations of the Journal Man," Oregon Journal, Portland, November 21, 1938, page 10