E. M. Barnum, Adj. Gen. O.T.:
    Sir:--Herewith I have the honor to submit to you a detailed account of the operations of the Northern Battalion, Southern Division, Oregon Mounted Volunteers under my command since my report of Nov. 3rd.
    After the battle of the Grave Creek Hills, in which a small portion of my command participated, a want of supplies compelled Col. Ross, commanding the ninth regiment Oregon militia, and Capt. Smith, of the regulars, to withdraw their forces from this point. Whilst making every preparation to renew the attack upon the Indians in their recent stronghold, it was ascertained that they had abandoned their position, and from the best information that could be obtained, I was led to believe had removed further to the westward and probably taken up a position somewhere on the headwaters of the Coquille, in the big bend of Cow Creek, or possibly in the lower Rogue River country. In either event their proximity to the thickly settled districts on the south side of the South Umpqua River, and the great exposure of this portion of Umpqua Valley, determined me to install a sufficient force from the several companies under my command to occupy positions to check any demonstrations of the enemy in this quarter. For this purpose, Capt. Bailey, company A, of Lane County, was ordered to proceed to Camas Prairie, on the waters of the Coquille, a point easily accessible to the Umpqua Valley, and commanding the nearest and best trails from the coast as well as that leading across the Umpqua Mountains to lower Rogue River. Capt. Gordon, of the Douglas company, was ordered to occupy a position on Cow Creek, about eight miles above the mouth of that stream, in order to protect the settlements in that quarter from the incursions of the Cow Creek Indians, who had so recently committed such outrages between the Canyon and Grave Creek. Lieut. T. W. Prather, with a detachment of the same company, was ordered for the present to proceed up the North Umpqua, to keep an eye upon a small band of Indians who were reported to be in that area.
    Under the proclamation of the Governor, authorizing the organization of two southern battalions, one cardinal object was to keep open a line of communication from the valleys of the Willamette and Umpqua south to the California line. For this purpose, Capt. Keener's company, of Linn County, was stationed at Camp Bailey, about five miles south of the crossing of Cow Creek, with orders to protect the road from the latter point to Grave Creek. For a similar object, Capt. Buoy's company B, of Lane County, was stationed at the south end of the Canyon--[Camp Elliff]--with orders to keep open the communication from [his post] to the [Cow] Creek crossing. Such was the disposition of my force on the 10th of November, with headquarters at Camp Bailey. No immediate movement could be made against the Indians, as it was quite uncertain where they were to be found since their departure from the Grave Creek Hills. Had I even been in possession of this information, there was not ten days' rations on the line from Roseburg to headquarters. My first object was therefore to bring up supplies for a winter campaign if necessary.
    On the 17th of November, I received an express dispatch from Major Bruce, commanding the Southern Battalion, Southern Division, O.M. Vols., informing me that the Indians had made their appearance on Jumpoff Joe, and were supposed to be in force somewhere on the waters of that stream, and requesting me to cooperate with him with all my available force. I immediately ordered up a detachment of thirty-five men from Capt. Bailey's company, and forty from Capt. Chapman's company of Umpqua County, having been notified that this company was now in the field and ready to move. With Capt. Bailey's detachment, I proceeded to Camp Vannoy, headquarters of the Southern Battalion. In the meantime, Capt. Williams, commanding a company in Maj. Bruce's command, had fallen in with and routed a small [force] of Indians near the mouth of Jumpoff Joe, supposed to be the force which had given the alarm a few days before, and to which Maj. Bruce referred in his dispatch of [the] 17th. In a conference with Major Bruce and Capt. Judah of Fort Jones, Cal., it was determined to move our whole available force down Rogue River, under a clear conviction that the enemy had proceeded in that direction. Whilst I fully concurred in this as the most advisable course to pursue, I was fully aware of the difficulties and hazards of a campaign at this season, across the mountains covered with snow, and liable within a few hours at any time during the rainy season to be blocked up to an extent to bar the transit either of men or supplies. But no alternative was left but to do this, or go into winter quarters. The latter course could not be entertained for a moment, until one attempt had been made to strike an effectual blow against the enemy. To embarrass the movements of the battalion under my immediate command still further, notwithstanding my own exertions and those of the quartermaster's department, supplies had come forward barely fast enough to subsist the men and animals from day to day. I was therefore compelled to draw upon the quartermaster of the Southern Battalion for ten days' rations. Arrangements being completed for our march, on the morning of the 20th of November, two companies of the Southern Battalion, Capts. Williams' and Alcorn's, were ordered to proceed down the south side of Rogue River, crossing the mountains which separate that stream from Illinois Valley, and join the main body of our forces somewhere in the vicinity of Little Meadows. Two companies of the Northern Battalion, under Capts. Keeney and Buoy, had already proceeded down Grave Creek in advance of the main force. On the 21st, the residue of our force, consisting of Capts. Rice's and Wilkinson's companies, under Major Bruce, one company of regulars, under Capt. Judah, and [thirty-four men] a detachment of company A, of Lane County, under Capt. Bailey of my own battalion, took up the line of march from my headquarters at Camp Leland. Near the close of the first day's march I discovered three or four Indians on an elevated point of a mountain overlooking our route, which I then supposed, as it afterwards proved, to be a scouting party. Soon after camping an alarm was given and instant preparation made for an attack, caused by one of our guards, posted on the hill to guard the animals, firing upon and probably wounding one of this party.
    Our second day's march, across a very elevated ridge from Grave Creek to the mouth of Whiskey Creek, on Rogue River, was one of great difficulty, and attended with much fatigue, both to the men and their animals. Capts. Buoy and Keeney had reached here the day before. From the reports of the scouts, as well as from the appearance of a recent encampment at this place, I was no longer in doubt that the Indians were either retiring before our forces, or concentrating their strength at some point in the vicinity of the Meadows. We therefore determined to push forward to that point, notwithstanding the shortness of our supplies, for two reasons: the hope of soon falling in with the enemy, and the assurance of our guides that [an abundance of] grass would be found there for our animals. Accordingly, early on Saturday, the 24th of November, our forces were toiling to the summit of the narrow divide which leads from the mouth of Whiskey Creek to the Little Meadows, a distance of 12 or 14 miles. Our progress was much impeded by the thick growth of low brushwood which covers the summit of the mountain, and the fallen timber across the trail. In descending the mountain, just before reaching camp, the attention of Capt. Judah, who led the advance, was arrested by the appearance of a camp on the river to his left, some five or six miles. Upon consultation with the guides, Capt. Judah was informed that it was the point where Capt. Williams' [detachment] (before referred to) would strike the river in crossing the mountain from Illinois Valley. The number and character of the tents confirmed the impression of the guides that this detachment had reached the river in advance of us. About sundown we encamped upon a small tableland or jog in the mountains, which here, and for many miles below, sweeps down the river with a gentle declivity, and covered with a luxuriant growth of grass denominated the Meadows. It was determined to remain here until the location of the Indians could be certainly ascertained. Accordingly, early on the following morning scouts were dispatched up and down the river to discover their whereabouts, or any recent traces of their movements. Much to our surprise, about 10 o'clock the detachment of Capts. Williams and Alcorn was discovered descending the mountain on our trail of yesterday, having crossed Rogue River at the mouth of Whiskey Creek, some three hours after the main body left camp at that point. The doubt as to the character of our neighbors in the canyon above was at once cleared up. Thos. East, the scout who had been dispatched down the river, returned early in the afternoon, bringing no information except having discovered a few moccasin tracks, all leading up the stream. On a consultation with Major Bruce, Capt. Judah, of the regulars, and the captains of the several companies, a plan of attack was arranged for the following morning, Nov. 26th, subject in the meantime to be modified by the report of R. S. Belknap and James P. Barns, the spies who had ascended the river. It was near daylight of the next day after their departure, before their return, in consequence of which I felt some little apprehension for their safety. They had succeeded in approaching closely upon the Indians, by descending a sharp spur of the mountains fronting directly upon their encampment, on the opposite side of the river. As this point could only be gained safely after dark, the number of the Indians, or the character of the fortifications on which they were evidently [at work], could not be determined. That they were fully apprised of our presence, and making every preparation for defense, was not doubted. The position of the Indians was one of great natural strength. From the mouth of Whiskey Creek to the Meadows, the river threads its way at the bottom of a deep and uninterrupted canyon, formed on the south side of the river by a mountain running parallel to its course, very precipitous, and for the most part covered with a heavy growth of fir and pine, so thickly set with undergrowth as scarcely to be penetrated. On the north side the river is lined with a succession of serrated points or spurs, thrown off at right angles to the river from the ridge which our forces had traversed in reaching the Meadows. To reach the river in the neighborhood of the Indians, from the north, by descending along the bottom of one of the intervening gorges, was impossible; to do so by descending the spur fronting the hostile camp, before referred to, our scouts pronounced a work of extreme difficulty, and barely practicable.
    Capt. Judah had brought forward from Fort Lane, with great difficulty, a mountain howitzer with twenty rounds of shot and shell, which, in the hands of this experienced officer, could not fail to be very effective if a position could be gained to bring the Indians' works within range of the gun. In this particular, Capt. Judah was left to the guidance of his own judgment, with the assurance on the part of Major Bruce and myself of any support which he might need in addition to his force of regulars. Our first intention was to move under cover of night, but the guides were of the opinion that it would be impossible for the men to work their way in darkness across the gorges and through the dense undergrowth which covered the mountains for five or six miles--the distance to be traversed from a point opposite to our camp to the bar on which the Indians had fortified themselves. Our plan of attack was therefore to be put in execution as at first arranged. Maj. Bruce, with a force of about three hundred men, composed of the four companies of his own battalion, and one company--Capt. Keener's--of the Northern Battalion, was to cross the river at the most practicable point nearly opposite the camp--once across, to extend his line as far up the mountain as possible, his left, Keener's company [resting on the river], and Capt. Williams' formed the right.
    In this order he was to proceed up the river, and if successful in reaching the neighborhood of the Indians by a flank movement of his right to enclose their camp. At the same time myself with the residue of my battalion, about one hundred men, companies A and B, Capts. Bailey and Buoy, accompanied by Capt. Judah, with the howitzer and fifty regulars, were to retrace our last day's march, about six miles, at that point making a sharp turn to the right along the ridge which would lead us to the spur overlooking the village before referred to. We were informed that the mules used to transport the howitzer could travel within a half or three-quarters of a mile of the break of the ridge overlooking the river. At this place the summit of the mountain became so narrow and irregular as to admit of the passage of the men only by hewing steps in the shelving cliffs and broken [crown] of the ridge, and where a misstep would send the unfortunate footman to certain destruction. The point once reached, the descent was almost equally difficult. Capt. Judah, in the face of all these obstacles, was determined nevertheless to make the attempt to reach the only position where his piece would command the entire encampment of the Indians; and if found practicable, I had determined to throw a part of my force across the river under cover of the howitzer and thus in conjunction with Maj. Bruce to attack them in front and rear. The two divisions left camp early on the morning of the 26th and proceeded as rapidly as possible to their respective points of operation. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon, having reached a position that commanded a view of the river and canyon where Maj. Bruce was to cross, I was first [apprised] by the report of firearms at short intervals, of the opposition which his division had met with in attempting to cross the river. My first impression was that he had gained the timber on the opposite bank and [was] pushing skirmishing parties of the Indians before him towards the bar. It was near sundown when Capt. Judah and myself reached the point where we were to leave the transport mules. In the meantime the firing below had much increased and the appearance of small detachments of Bruce's command still on the north bank and a body of Indians swarming around a signal fire in plain view of us on a small open ridge that led down [to] the river on the south side about a mile below the ranches gave me pretty sure intimation that Maj. Bruce had been attacked in attempting to cross. Just at dark an express arrived from him confirming our worst fears, by informing us that he had been attacked in attempting to cross, and requested that Capt. Judah might return with the gun and cover a second attempt. It is due to Maj. Bruce here to say that the expressman totally misapprehended his message; that his object was only to notify myself and Capt. Judah; that he had been unable to proceed as anticipated; that no request was sent either for the gun or reinforcements.
    As any attempt to descend the mountain and make an attack from this side would be hazardous and fruitless without a cooperation on the other, I was reluctantly compelled to return to camp, as many of the men were much fatigued from the day's march. I left Capts. Bailey and Buoy encamped on the mountains. Capt. Judah and myself reached camp some hours after midnight, where we found Major Bruce, who had reached camp with his wounded soon after dark. For a detailed account of the operations of his division at the river, you will please see his report. Capt. Keeney, of my battalion, lost one man killed and one wounded. The remainder of the Northern Battalion reached camp early on the following day. Our field operations had now reached a crisis. Some movement was to be made and made quickly, either to make another attempt to dislodge the enemy or to retire to some point in reach of supplies.
    There were but three days' rations in camp on the 27th of Nov., and every appearance of an approaching storm. In the haste with which my command had been brought from the different posts on the call of Maj. Bruce, most of the tents and camp equipage had been left behind, the men, in active service since the date of their being called into the field, [had been] performing hard marches across mountains through rain and snow, and throwing themselves down at night without shelter or covering but their blankets, and poorly provided with those. [Most of them had been in active service since the date of their being called into the field and were now destitute.] Many were without shoes or boots and without clothing to protect them and scarcely enough to cover their nakedness.
    To pursue the first course, under the most favorable circumstances and with the greatest possible success that we could anticipate, would in any event throw upon our hands from 50 to 75 wounded men. To transport these across the mountains was impossible; to provide for such a contingency, by bringing up supplies to subsist a post at the Meadows during the winter season, was therefore a first and paramount object.
    Maj. Bruce and Capt. Judah, in view of these considerations, had already, on the 25th inst., sent an express to Fort Lane and [Camp Vannoy on the morning of the 25th to hasten forward supplies. With a similar] object, on the 28th [I] dispatched Adjutant R. E. Stratton, with an escort of forty men under Capt. Bailey, the escort upon reaching Grave Creek, to return with such trains as might be in readiness at that point. It was therefore determined to remain in our present position until the last moment. Mr. Stratton bore orders to Capts. Gordon and Chapman to repair with their respective companies immediately to the Meadows. Under an apprehension that the Indians, who were known to be somewhere on the waters of the Coquille or Cow Creek, might make a descent upon the settlements of the Umpqua, Mr. Stratton was left with discretionary orders for those companies, to retain them in the Umpqua if [necessary]. The precaution was found not unnecessary. On the 3rd day of December, a small party of the Cow Creeks attacked the settlements on the west of the South Umpqua, near Lookingglass Prairie, burning fifteen houses which had been abandoned by the inhabitants, killing a large amount of stock and destroying other property. On the morning of the 4th, they were attacked by a small party of citizen volunteers supported by a detachment of company A, under Sergeant Holland, and completely routed them with two of their number killed and [quite a number] known to have been wounded. One Mr. Price was wounded in defense of his house from the Indians, on the 3rd; Assistant Quartermaster General Cattleman, severely, in the attack upon the Indians on the 4th. My order to Capt. Chapman reached him at [Grave Creek. He immediately pushed on to] the Meadows, escorting the only supply train (Mr. [Fortner's]) in readiness at that point. I may here say that my battalion was much indebted for supplies to this active and efficient trainmaster. Capt. Chapman arrived at the Meadows on the 31st, bringing the intelligence to Capt. Judah that Capt. Smith, of Fort Lane, to whom he had sent for supplies, had come as far as the foot of the first mountain on the trail from Camp Leland, from which point, owing to the lateness of the season, the inclemency of the weather, and with a thorough knowledge of the country he had to traverse, he deemed it too hazardous to proceed further. Upon the receipt of this intelligence, Capt. Judah reluctantly announced his intention to return to Grave Creek.
    The snow was now falling rapidly, and the supplies which the last train brought were barely sufficient to provision the men to Camp Leland. Much as we regretted the course, necessity compelled Maj. Bruce and myself also to return to our respective headquarters. Owing to a doubt as to seniority of commission, neither Maj. Bruce nor myself felt authorized to assume the command of the regiment; yet, our intercourse with each other and with Capt. Judah, of the regulars, also, has been cordial and satisfactory. Since my last report, Adjutant J. W. Drew has resigned, and R. E. Stratton was appointed to fill the place on the 20th of Nov. I. N. Smith, Esq., and Mr. W. G. Hill have rendered me much assistance from time to time, as my aides. No important movement has taken place since my arrival at headquarters. My only object being to make such a disposition of my command as best to protect the road and settlements until such time as the Colonel of the regiment shall be elected under order of the Governor, of the ----- day of November.
By R. E. Stratton, Adjutant.
Table Rock Sentinel, Jacksonville, March 22, 1856, page 1    Corrections in brackets made from an original letter found in the Oregon State Archives, Yakima and Rogue River War, Document File B, Reel 3, Document 690.


    By the southern express we learn that the volunteers have found the Indians in a deep canyon about eight miles lower down on Rogue River than their former habitation of last winter, about seven hundred strong, and that Lamerick and Smith are erecting fortifications and preparing for a desperate onslaught upon the savage foe. It is represented that the Indians are also fortifying, and the prospects are good for a huge fight.
Letter dated "Roseburg, April 30," Oregon Statesman, Salem, May 13, 1856, page 2


    THE ROGUE RIVER INDIANS.--From some facts furnished by the Table Rock Sentinel (a new Oregon paper) of the 10th of May, it seems that hostilities in that quarter are not yet ended. Gen. Lamerick recently headed an expedition against the Indians at the Meadows. Several skirmishes were had with the Indians and two whites were wounded. The forces returned to Grave Creek, after having exhausted their provisions. Two hundred, however, remained at the Meadows, for the purpose of building blockhouses.
    On the 26th ult., Mr. McD. Harkness was murdered by the Indians, while endeavoring to convey a letter to Gen. Lamerick at the Meadows.
Sacramento Daily Union, May 23, 1856, page 1

To His Excellency, Geo. L. Curry, Governor of Oregon.
Respected Sir:--
    I have the honor to make the following report of an expedition to the Meadows. As you have been informed in a former communication, the Southern Battalion started from Fort Vannoy on the 17th of April, and went down the south side of Rogue River.
    On the 19th of April the Northern Battalion started from Fort Leland, and followed the trail traveled by the troops last winter. On the 20th we camped on Whiskey Creek, near the mouth, as the rear guard was after night in getting into camp, and most of the men being very tired from a long day's march.
    A dispatch had arrived in camp before I got in from the Southern Battalion under the command of Lieut. Col. Chapman and Major Bruce, informing me that they had sent out Capt. Bushey with seventeen men to spy out the Indians, who were supposed to be camped at the same place they were last winter. The spies returned and informed Col. Chapman and Major Bruce that they had been on the bar, that they built a small fire to warm themselves by, and while standing around it, they were fired upon by some Indians from the mountain above the bar. The spies then scattered and made their way to pea-vine camp, where the command under Lieut. Col. Chapman and Major Bruce had been for some three days detained on account of the severity of the weather--the rain and snow falling heavily all the time. Lieut. Col. Chapman also informed me that a number of their beef cattle had gone back to Fort Vannoy. I sent word to Lieut. Col. Chapman to move with the command as fast as possible, as they on the south side of the river had much farther to travel than the command on the south [sic] side, under Col. Kelsay and Major Latshaw.
    On the 21st I left for the little Meadows and arrived with the entire Northern Battalion, early in the afternoon. Capt. Barnes, of the spy company, with some of his men went to the edge of the hill upon which we were camped, and discovered the Indians encamped on a bar opposite the big Meadows. On the night of the 21st I employed four men to carry an express to Lieut. Col. Chapman and Major Bruce, informing them of the whereabouts of the enemy, with instructions for them to consult their spies as to the character of the country south of Rogue River, and the time it would take to reach the enemy's position, and left it optional with them as to which side of the river they would come down, and also desired them to inform me of their decision.
    Signals were to be used by myself and Lieut. Col. Chapman to designate our different positions and on what side of the river the enemy were encamped. These signals were to be placed on some prominent point near our respective camps. I promptly attended to placing the signal on my side of the river on the 22nd.
    The messengers to Lieut. Col. Chapman returned on the evening of the 22nd, and informed me that the Southern Battalion would cross Rogue River at the mouth of Whiskey Creek the same evening and would join our command that night, but on account of a heavy fall of snow and rain the command did not arrive until the next evening.
    The messengers in returning from Lieut. Col. Chapman discovered a horse on the trail recently shot through the body and bleeding and evident signs of Indians. The messengers then left the trail and came to camp through the mountains. On the next day the command under Lieut. Col. Chapman arrived bringing the body of Mr. M. Harkness, horribly mutilated; his remains were interred at our camp; his companion, Mr. Wagoner, narrowly escaped, a ball having passed through his coat very near his body, but he was fortunate enough to meet the Southern Battalion at the crossing, and so escaped.
    Mr. Harkness was bearer of dispatches to me, some of which was supposed to be from Capt. Smith, U.S.A., now at the mouth of Rogue River.
    On the day of the 22nd, I ordered a detachment under the command of Col. Kelsay and Major Latshaw to cross the canyon west of our camp and reconnoiter the position of the enemy, which was done by the officers and men with great promptness. On their return they informed me the enemy were encamped in a very strong position on the south side of Rogue River. On the 24th a detachment under the command of Major Bruce, of 150 men, were ordered to reconnoiter the big Meadows and to ascertain if any Indians were in that neighborhood; the distance being greater than was expected, the expedition returned without getting up to the Meadows.
    As this was the first clear day, a detachment was again sent to reconnoiter the enemy's camp; it consisted of 100 men from the Southern Battalion under the command of Col. Kelsay and Major Latshaw. The spies under the command of Capt. Barnes were in the meantime doing good service in finding a crossing on the river and a trail to get the boats down.
    I formed a plan of attack which was to cross the Southern Battalion at night, under the command of Lieut. Col. Chapman and Major Bruce, Lieut. Col. Chapman to command the right wing and Major Bruce the left, on the south side of the river. After consulting the field officers, all of whom completely approved of the plan, I issued orders to the different officers to get their respective commands in readiness to move at 12 o'clock at night of the 25th; Col. Kelsay was to command the right wing of the Northern Battalion and Major Latshaw the left wing, and to attack the enemy from the north side of the river. A little after sundown, Major Bruce came to my tent and informed me that most of the officers of the Southern Battalion were opposed to crossing the river. I requested Major Bruce to invite the different captains of that command to my quarters. I asked them separately why they objected to crossing the river. Some of the reasons were that they would be at too great a distance from medical assistance. Several other reasons were given, which at present, is not worth mentioning. Accompanying this dispatch you will find a plan in pencil marked with each officer's position, and the command under him. Being compelled by the circumstances of the case to abandon this plan, arrangements were made for an attack at daylight on the morning of the 27th. I ordered a detachment of 100 men from the Northern Battalion, under the command of Col. Kelsay and Major Latshaw, to proceed from camp at 3 o'clock in the morning and cross what is known as Kelsay's Canyon [Kelsey Canyon], and bring on an attack at the lower end of the bar. Major Bruce was ordered to take a detachment of 150 men of the Southern Battalion and commence an attack at the upper end of the bar, or to act as circumstances might suggest. The balance of the command with the pack animals and provisions were to move under the command of Lieut. Col. Chapman and myself, to cross Kelsay's Canyon near its mouth. Capt. Bushey's company were ordered to take possession of this pass, to prevent the Indians from firing at the trains as they crossed. This detachment was ordered to take possession of the big Meadows and form a camp, as grass was abundant, and on account of its proximity to the enemy's camp. As the morning was very foggy, Col. Kelsay got up within a short distance of the enemy's camp before it was discovered. Three of the Indians had crossed as spies at daylight, and were up the bank a short distance. They discovered Col. Kelsay's command rapidly approaching; they raised the war whoop and recrossed the river to camp, but the gallant volunteers under Col. Kelsay and Major Latshaw moved with so much alacrity that a destructive and deadly fire was poured into the enemy's camp, which quite took him by surprise. The command kept up a continued fire amongst the Indians as they ran out of their huts, and must have done great execution. The command under Major Bruce no sooner heard the report of their companion's guns than they rushed with great impetuosity into the fight, and after about an hour's heavy firing on both sides the Indians were completely silenced and driven back on the bar, leaving many dead on the ground. Although they used great exertions to carry them off they were obliged to leave them until night set in. In this action we had one man of Capt. Wilkinson's company (named Isaac Mercer) mortally wounded, who has since died. A scattering fire was kept up until about 3 o'clock p.m., when the command was called off, except a few left to keep the Indians from getting their supplies. Most of the men returned to camp at the big Meadows, where the trains had been ordered by the regimental quartermaster; the rain and snow fell so heavily in the evening and during the night that the guard at the river was called in by the officers in command at that station. On the following morning Col. Kelsay with a detachment of 150 men of the Northern Battalion was ordered to go down the river about three miles below the bar, and if possible to effect a crossing for the purpose of cutting off the retreat of the Indians. When his command arrived at the river, they found some Indians and a running fight ensued, in which a private of Capt. Sheffield's company was severely wounded. We were prevented from crossing the river--the weather was cold and disagreeable all day.
    During the fight of the 27th, a small detachment went down on the north side of the river, for the purpose of capturing any animals that might be below; within a short distance they fell in with two Indians, killed one and shot the other through the shoulder. On the evening of the 28th, we discovered the signal fires of the Indians making down the river, and saw the squaws crossing a bald hill on the south side of the river, making towards the coast. On this evening, Capts. Keith and Blakely's companies arrived under the command of Major Massey, and were camped on the lower big Meadows, near John Mule Creek. On the 29th I ordered the command to cross the river in pursuit of the enemy, and to endeavor to go out by Illinois Valley. This evening with the assistance of the two canvas boats, which I had made at Jacksonville, we all got across the river with provisions, camp equipage, &c. The rain and snow still continued, and on the 30th the storm so increased, and the snow fell to such a depth on the mountains, that it was considered by all who were acquainted with the country that it was impossible for the troops to move in that direction. After consulting the field officers we concluded to establish a military post at the big Meadows, near the mouth of John Mule Creek. Officers and men are of the opinion that Limpy's, George's and John's tribes of Indians were here, as several horses were captured which were taken to Hay's ranch by John's band. Some surgical instruments were found belonging to Dr. Barkwell, taken at the same time and place. Some saddles were found which were taken by the same band of Indians last winter at Murphy's creek. We also found two scalps of white persons--one of them was recognized as having belonged to Mr. Harkness, the other not known; they were both buried; many things were found, which had been stolen or captured by the Indians during the winter.
    The troops during the late action behaved most gallantly and deserve the gratitude of a generous public. There has been a complete discomfiture of the Indians in their notorious stronghold; during the fight, the Indians called loudly for a treaty and a good talk. Some of the volunteers said the Indians offered to give up their guns and anything else the whites wished, if they would only treat with them. There is now an opportunity to treat with the Indians on any terms. A station has been established at the big Meadows; Major James Bruce is in command. Capt. Keith and Capt. Blakely of the 2nd Battalion of recruits, and Capt. Williams and Capt. Wilkinson, with their companies, are also stationed at this post. The two last named companies will soon have served their time out, and it is but simple justice to say that these companies have served their country most faithfully. Capt. Sheffield and Capt. O'Neil's companies have served their time out, and have received orders to give their men honorable discharges. The spy company under Capt. James Barnes has rendered the command and the country distinguished services, being always ready and willing to move at a moment's notice.
    I have received encouraging news from the Port Orford company, under the command of Capt. Ralph Bledsoe. His company has rendered good service; most of the Indians are now for peace. Col. Buchanan and Capt. Smith are making their headquarters at the big bend of Rogue River, some fourteen miles west of our station at the Meadows. At present, the troops are destitute of sugar and coffee; something must be done soon to furnish these articles for the troops, or it will be difficult to keep them in the field.
    Col. Kelsay has received orders to station Capt. George and Capt. Bushey's companies at Fort Hay, in Illinois Valley, and to make such other dispositions of his command as will ensure general protection of the settlements. Capt. Noland's company are stationed on the west side of the South Umpqua River, and are doing good service in protecting the families and escorting trains to the Meadows. A near trail has been opened, by which pack trains can make a trip from Roseburg to the military station at the Meadows in from 3 to 4 days. A vast mining region has been discovered on lower Rogue River, and John Mule Creek, which can accommodate from four to five thousand miners, and will create quite a market for the produce of the Umpqua Valley and Southern Oregon generally. With the greatest respect,
    I am, my dear sir,
        Your most obt. servant
            JOHN K. LAMERICK
                Brig. Gen. O.T.
Oregon Weekly Times, Portland, May 17, 1856, page 2

    From Messrs. Bradbury and Dearborn, of the south, we learn that the volunteers, to the number of 250, under Gen. Lamerick, surprised a party of Indians, comprising about 100 warriors and 200 women and children, on a bar of Rogue River, near the Meadows, and firing upon them, killed about thirty, and completely routing the remainder.
    The volunteers lost none, and had but two wounded, one (a Mr. Mercer, of Capt. Wilkinson's company) badly, a probably mortally. He was brought into the hospital at Deer Creek, and it is thought has died before this.
    The Indians retreated after fighting some time, and Gen. Lamerick immediately made preparations to follow them, resolved to "clean them out" effectually.
    The volunteers captured ten horses.
    The Indians were surprised, and the affair was adroitly managed throughout.
    Mr. [McDonough Harkness], of Grave Creek House, while carrying express from Grave Creek to Gen. Lamerick, was fired upon--fell from his horse--was horribly mutilated by the Indians--supposed while alive, as wound was not mortal.
Oregon Statesman, Salem, May 13, 1856, page 2


    The next morning at eight o'clock Sergeant Major Dawes read to the assembled battalion the following:
"Scraps of Southern Oregon History," Ashland Tidings, August 22 through October 24, 1879, page 3


    The Indians, so far from being whipped, are doubly insolent, since the late unsuccessful attack at the Meadows, which was a perfect failure on our part. The report that 30 or 40 Indians were killed and wounded is all bogus, gotten up to gull the "simple-minded."
    No one in this section attributes the failure to the volunteers. Having been censured on former occasions, they seemed determined this time to make clean work; which they no doubt would have done, if Gen. Lamerick had not been there. The volunteers are loud and strong in their denunciations of the course pursued by the General. Such is the feeling at present that it would be impossible to reorganize a volunteer corps under him. There is only a small force yet in the field, who hold the ground at the Meadows, not more perhaps than 100 men.
"From the South," Oregon Argus, Oregon City, June 14, 1856, page 2


    ROGUE RIVER INCIDENT.--The Yreka Union learns from a person just from Oregon, after the Indian fight on Rogue River, that after General Lamerick had arranged for the battle at the Meadows, and given orders to charge across the river, one of his men said, "Look here, Genul, this ain't gwine to do. Just as sure as you charge cross thar, some of us will get killed. Don't you know we got one man killed trying to cross here once before?" On another occasion, Major Bruce ordered his men to charge, and they responded to it with promptness, alacrity and gallantry, by saying, "Yes, we say charge; we'll chalk you out a d----d good charge, Major!"
Crescent City Herald, July 16, 1856, page 2


    NEW DIGGINGS.--Miners are going in considerable numbers down Rogue River to the Meadows, where very rich prospects were discovered during the last winter, when the volunteer army was there to attack the Indians. Many persons have been waiting until peace should be concluded, and as soon as it is known that John and Enos have surrendered there will be a great rush for that locality. We have conversed with a number of men who were there and prospected, or seen others prospect, and all say that these mines are certainly very rich. And it is thought that very soon there will be some thousands of men at work there. And we have heard some express the opinion that within a year a town will spring up there larger than Jacksonville.
    We learn that a great many of the volunteers that are at the Meadows are sick, and that they are being removed to Roseburg and the Grave Creek House, for medical attention.
Crescent City Herald, July 30, 1856, page 2





    On November twentieth Majors Martin and Bruce and Captain Judah left Evans' Creek, taking all the regular and volunteer troops which could be spared, and a sufficient supply of provisions for a short campaign. A day or two days later, dates differing, they encamped at the mouth of Whiskey Creek, and found traces of Indians. Proceeding down the river the next morning, keeping along the high lands back a mile or two from the stream, they found the Indians in strong force in the woods bordering the river. The country, as before mentioned, is exceedingly rough, covered with tangled underbrush, broken up into deep canyons, precipitous descents, and impenetrable gorges. It was deemed proper to cross to the south side of the river, and for this purpose Major Bruce proceeded with his battalion down to the river, being then near the mouth of Jackass Creek, and attempted to cross. The battalion were scattered upon the bar which borders the river on the north bank, and some engaged themselves in endeavoring to construct rafts to ferry the command across, while others prospected for gold in the gravelly bar. Indians within the dense cover of the trees along the south bank began firing, and the whites hurriedly left the bar and sought shelter in the brush. Captain Alcorn shouted "Form a line here; where the ------ are you running?" But his lieutenant replied, "Form ------ and ------! Break for the brush, every one of you, or you'll get shot!" And the privates thought the latter advice best, and hid themselves with desperate haste. This closed the campaign as far as the battalion of Major Bruce was concerned, for thus defeated in their attempt to cross the river they retired to communicate with Martin and Judah. The latter officer signalized himself on many occasions throughout his residence on the Pacific Coast by his devotion to artillery practice. A heavy twelve-pound howitzer was the inseparable companion of all his expeditions to fight the Indians. On this occasion he had brought this piece with infinite difficulty and labor to the Meadows, and at the time of Bruce's discomfiture he with Martin lay upon the hill above him and several miles away, firing from that lofty position his clumsy piece of ordnance at the enemy, with the effect only to set the wild echoes flying through the hitherto silent solitude. After a deal of unprofitable practice the trio of commanders resolved upon a retrograde march, and loading Captain Judah's toy upon a stalwart mule, the army slowly retired to Vannoy's and Camp Leland. One volunteer, William Lewis, of Keeney's company, was killed, and five were wounded. At least one Indian bit the dust, for George Cherry killed a brave and carried the scalp tied to his war horse's bridle.
    The various detachments arrived at the Grave Creek camp on November twenty-first, and the companies were separated, being sent to guard the more exposed places and endeavor to keep the savages from making forays upon the inhabited country lying to the westward of their position. The weather came on exceedingly cold and nearly put a stop to all military operations for a time. The various companies went into winter quarters, but a few events took place in December to prove to the citizens that a state of war existed. The first of these was the descent of some twenty or thirty Indians upon the Rice settlement at the mouth of Lookingglass Creek, eight miles south of Roseburg. The hostiles burned the Rice house, and captured some firearms and did other damage. A small company of men, commanded by J. P. Day, went from Deer Creek to the scene and engaged and defeated the Indians, killing three, it was said. The stolen guns, horses, etc., were recaptured. Castleman, a member of the company, was slightly wounded. The affray occurred on the second of December. The Indians were probably Cow Creeks, a band of disaffected natives, who were actuated by hostility to the whites, but did not, it appears, feel sufficiently warlike to join Limpy and George on the banks of Rogue River.
    Some few of the peaceable, yet wretched and debased family of the Umpquas, resided in and around the pleasant vale of Lookingglass, and these, true to their harmless instincts, refrained from war throughout the troublous times of the conflict in the south, and sought by every humble act to express their dependence on and liking for the whites. When war broke out on Rogue River, these inoffensive people were gathered in Lookingglass Valley, occupying a rancheria on the creek of that name, where they lived at peace with all the world, and ignorant and careless of everything outside of their own little sphere. Mr. Arrington was nominally their agent and protector. In an evil hour--for them--certain white people of that vicinity, who imagined that they were dangerous neighbors, organized themselves into a company, and fell suddenly upon the helpless little community, and scattered them to the four winds of heaven. Several men were killed, and one old squaw, in whom old age and rheumatic bones defeated nature's first law of self-preservation, died, a victim, unmeant perhaps, but still a victim, and slain by white men's bullets. The date of this transaction is at hand, and proof of all its particulars, but like other wrongs and much violence done that race, it best were buried, and only resurrected to serve the truth where truth needs telling.
    On Cow Creek quite a series of disturbances occurred during the winter of 1855-6. The first of these in brief was the attack on some hog drovers from Lane County, who were traversing the road. H. Bailey was killed instantly, and Z. Bailey and three others wounded. The Indians burned on that day (October 24, 1855) the houses and barns of Turner, Bray, Fortune, Redfield and one other. Mr. Redfield placed his family in a wagon and started for a place of safety, but soon the horses were shot, and he took his wife upon his back and carried her to a fortified place. Mrs. Redfield was wounded, however, before reaching there.
    The raid of certain Indians through Camas, Ten Mile and Lookingglass valleys is detailed in another part of this volume. This affair occurred in the later months of the war.
    Late in March Major Latshaw, of the second regiment, set out on an expedition against the Cow Creek Indians, taking with him a portion of the companies of Robertson, Wallan, Sheffield and Barnes. On the twenty-fourth of the month some Indians were found at the big bend of Cow Creek, and were attacked and routed. Several of them were killed or wounded, and one white man, Private William Daley, of Sheffield's company, was killed, and Captain Barnes and privates Andrew Jones, A. H. Woodruff and J. Taylor were wounded. The Indians disappeared from the vicinity after this defeat, and did not return for a considerable time. These incidents comprise the principal hostile acts which took place in Douglas County.
    The people on Butte Creek, in Jackson County, had, with the first alarm of war, sought safety in a camp of log houses on Felix O'Neal's donation claim. Several families--in fact, nearly the whole population of the country adjoining--made their residences there for a time, and carried out measures of defense. Alcorn's company was recruited among the hardy settlers thereabouts, and subsequent to their return from the first meadows campaign, were posted in part at this fortified camp, and served to restore public confidence. Jake, a well-known chief of a small band of Indians, with his braves had long inhabited that portion of the country, and had refused to go on the reservation. The Indian agent, owing to the smallness of their numbers, had never thought it necessary to compel them to go there, and so they were suffered to remain, a nuisance, if not a positive danger to the whites. They were said to steal, and were not supposed to be above the crime of burning buildings. They dwelt in a rancheria between the Butte creeks. On the night of December twenty-fourth, Captain Alcorn, with a part of his men, marched to the rancheria and camped within a mile of it, in the cold and snow. At daybreak the next morning the troops moved within rifle range, and began to fire. This they kept up until the natives were killed or dispersed, their loss being eight "bucks" killed, and the remainder wounded. One squaw was wounded in the jaw, and two men were captured. Only four guns were taken, but no ammunition, and three stolen horses were recaptured. Old Jake, the chief, was not in the fight, and was reported killed by the Shastas.
    A similar affair occurred at the same date between a detachment of Captain Rice's company, numbering thirty-four men, and the Indians of a rancheria four miles from and on the north side of Rogue River, and just below the mouth of Big Butte Creek. A night march and an attack at daybreak formed the salient features of this affair also, which was likewise completely successful. The Indians were taken by surprise, and after several hours' fighting eighteen males were killed, and twenty squaws and children captured and the rancheria burned. The Indians, finding themselves surrounded, fought bravely to the last. But one female was injured in the fight.
    On the same day on which the detachments of Alcorn and Rice started out, a third one consisting of twenty men of Bushey's company set out on a scouting tour to the neighborhood of Williams' Creek, where a portion of old John's band were busying themselves in many a hostile way, much raised in self-esteem by the partial successes of their bold leader since the war began. On the evening of the same day an Indian trail was found by a spy party, which was followed the next day by the command, but without finding the rancheria. During the evening a man strayed off and became lost. The next day was spent in searching for him under the impression that he had fallen a victim to Indian barbarity. However, on the following day news came of his safe arrival at Thompson's ranch, on the Applegate, and of his having found a camp of ten or twelve Indians, near whom he camped for the night, but escaped unobserved. Orders were immediately given for following that trail, and, the command being divided, the Indian camp was easily found. The foremost detachment, seven in number, opened fire on them and and killed three, putting the rest to flight. No whites were injured.
    Toward the last of December some scouts who happened to be near the forks of the Applegate discovered that a body of Indians probably twelve or so in number had taken possession of two deserted miners' cabins and had gone into winter quarters there, preparing themselves for a state of siege by excavating the floors of the houses and piling the dirt against the walls so as to form a protection against rifle bullets. The scouts withdrew unseen, and going to Sterling told the news. A body of sixty or more miners and others went immediately to watch the cabins and prevent the Indians from escaping, while word was sent to various military companies who began to repair to the spot. Captain Bushey arrived, and finding the position too strong for his small force to take, awaited the arrival of others. Captain Smith sent Lieutenants Hagen and Underwood with twenty-five regulars and the inevitable howitzer, with the design of shelling the savages out, but the fortune of war was unpropitious. The mule carrying the ammunition was so heedless as to fall into a deep creek and be killed, while the powder was ruined. More ammunition was sent for, and Lieutenant Sweitzer with sixteen regulars brought it on a mule. This animal was more fortunate, and the regular army drew up in front of the cabins and at a safe distance fired a shell which passed into or through a cabin and killed, as the records say, two savages. But before the howitzer's arrival the Indians had signalized themselves by a strong resistance. They had killed a man by a rifle shot, at a distance of 500 yards--a display of marksmanship equal to the best known among the whites. Five whites had been wounded.
    After the shell was fired, the regulars postponed further operations until the morrow, as night was near. When they arose the next morning their birds had flown and the cages were empty. Quite a force of volunteers had gathered upon the scene. There were Captain Rice and his company, from the upper end of Bear Creek; some men of Alcorn's company, a few volunteers from Jacksonville, and a delegation from the Applegate. A much regretted event occurred during the day; this was the killing of Martin Angel, of Jacksonville, who set out to accompany the regulars to Star Gulch, the scene of the siege. When two and a half miles from Jacksonville, on the Crescent City road, Angel and Walker, who were about two hundred and fifty yards in advance, were fired on by Indians concealed in the brush beside the road. Angel was killed instantly, four balls passing through his head and neck. Walker was not hit, but escaped death narrowly. When the troops came up the Indians had stripped the dead man and were just retreating into the brush. On the same day (January 2,) Charles W. Hull was killed on the divide between Jackson and Jackass creeks, his body being soon found by scouts. Deceased was hunting, but becoming separated from his friends, was waylaid and murdered by Indians. These occurrences, happening so near to the principal town of the whole region, made a very deep impression, and there were those who apprehended the greatest dangers from the "red devils." But happily these were not realized, and the clamors of war died from the listening ears in Jacksonville.
    The history of the Applegate affair includes still another chapter. After it was found that the Indians had made their escape, the regulars returned to the quiet and seclusion of Fort Lane, while Major Bruce, who had arrived upon the field, set out with portions of Rice's, Williamson's and Alcorn's companies to follow up the wily strategists who had so valiantly defended their positions, and so unexpectedly escaped. Following the trail of the fleeing Indians to the west, the scouts came upon a single Indian, who ran at the top of his speed directly to the Indian camp. The savages, warned by the shouting of the pursued, prepared for a fight and for quite a while resisted that part of Bruce's command which came into action, killing one man, Wiley Cash, of Alcorn's company, and seriously wounding Private Richardson, of O'Neal's company. Some ten or twelve horses, left unguarded by the whites, were taken by the Indians, and several more were shot. This fight occurred on the twenty-first of January, the locality being Murphy's Creek, tributary to the Applegate. Only twenty-five men participated at first, but Lieutenant Armstrong came up with a small reinforcement, and after a most plucky fight succeeded in saving the lives of the detachment. They were surrounded and, being separated from the main body of the troops, could not possibly have escaped but for the providential arrival. The total number of Indians engaged under the leadership of John was probably about fifty.
    The organization of the "southern army," as it was called, it will be recollected, was begun by Colonel John E. Ross. For some reason hard to make out, but certainly not from any reasonable cause, the command of the volunteers on Rogue River was, by proclamation of the governor, dated October 20, 1855, placed in the hands of two officers each with the rank of major, and possessing distinct commands. This notable piece of strategy proved not to succeed well, owing to causes which anyone could have foreseen, and after its ineffectiveness became apparent to the governor and his prime minister, Adjutant General Barnum, the two battalions were united and elevated to the dignity of a regiment, and an election of colonel, lieutenant colonel and majors was ordered for December seventh. Robert L. Williams was chosen colonel. This officer had attained a deserved reputation as an "Indian fighter," and was popularly supposed to be devoid of fear. His qualifications for the office consisted in a highly developed hatred of Indians, a thorough knowledge of their tactics, and the liking of his fellow soldiers, who had elected him triumphantly over Bruce and Wilkinson, both efficient commanders. W. J. Martin became lieutenant colonel, whose command was to be the "right column," which was a newly invented name for the northern battalion. James Bruce remained as major, commanding the "left column" (southern battalion), and Charles S. Drew continued in his place as adjutant. Colonel Williams' regiment was officially styled the second regiment of the Oregon Mounted Volunteers, and consisted at the time of the colonel's election of the companies of Captains Bailey, Buoy, Keeney, Rice, O'Neal, Wilkinson, Alcorn, Gordon, Chapman and Bledsoe, the aggregate on paper being 901 rank and file, but the effective force was much less. This imposing force lay the greater part of the winter separately stationed at various points wherever their services were required as guards. Occasionally something occurred to break the stagnant routine of camp life, but not often. An Indian raid might be expected, else the war would have lost all attraction. The main body of the army, lying in what is now Josephine County, centered at Vannoy's as their headquarters. The right column remained about the southern boundary of Douglas County.
    Almost the only interesting bit of information of a jocular character which survives to this day is the memorable trip of Captain Keeney from his post to the verdure-clad plains of the Willamette. Captain Keeney was dissatisfied with guard duty. He hungered for a sight of the hills of Lane County. He applied to Colonel Williams for a furlough, but his commanding officer refused, saying no furloughs would be granted until the last Indian in Southern Oregon was killed. The Captain persisted; the Colonel told him to "go to grass." Captain Keeney returned to his command and indignantly related the story of his wrongs, when a private suggested, "He probably meant the Willamette; that's the only grass we've seen." The Captain, elated, said, "Boys, shall we go to grass?" The answer was unanimously affirmative. They broke camp, a hundred strong, arrived in Roseburg December 27, and were in sight of their own homes in time to wish their friends a happy new year. The joke was a good one, but Lieutenant Colonel William J. Martin failed to see it as such. He made it a part of his official business to prefer charges against the homesick farmers who found the war so different from their joyous anticipations. This stern martinet accused Captain Keeney of disobedience to orders, abandoning his position in face of the enemy, "uniform ungentlemanly conduct," and other like charges of formidable tenor. The governor suspended him, but at a later date, as we perceive, the company with their captain were restored to all the rights and privileges pertaining to the most obedient, steady and reliable of soldiers.
    In this time of monotony and ennui charges and counter-charges (verbal) were frequent. In February Major Bruce. incensed by the torpor of the volunteers, addressed a communication to Governor Curry, preferring charges against Colonel Williams for inactivity, failure to make public certain orders addressed by the Governor to the troops, etc. Captains O'Neal, Rice, Alcorn and Wilkinson also appended their names to these charges, whose outcome was the appointment of a brigadier general to shoulder the responsibility which Williams was unequal to. These charges were based on the latter's supposed partiality toward a certain clique of speculators who were thought at the time, and since, to be using their influence to prolong the war in order to further their pecuniary object. The whole subject of the war is entangled throughout with political and financial relations that are exceedingly difficult to unravel, and seem to ill repay the investigator, but nevertheless are so intermingled in people's minds with the cause of the war that it would be impossible to enter upon an examination without giving offense to those whose opinions are already formed. These chapters are written in the firm belief that hostilities with the aborigines were unavoidable, which it requires no very deep reasoning to make apparent. Wherever the Caucasian and the American Indian have come in contact, war and bloodshed have resulted. Even in the remote Eastern States, where the Pilgrim Fathers made head against opposing man and nature, the red men were the first and their worst enemies, and even their Puritanical principles could not avoid a war of extermination. Then from analogy we declare that the removal of the Indians from Southern Oregon was a necessity. We admit its inexpediency, while on sentimental grounds we commiserate the unhappy and unfortunate humans whom ill-starred fate drove from a land which was theirs by the right of long possession.
    Sometime in the last days of January Colonel Williams removed the headquarters of the army to Charles Drew's farm, known as Forest Dale, near Jacksonville, and began the construction of barracks, stables and other buildings suitable for his purposes. This measure proved an unfortunate one for him, as it created quite a burst of indignation, being thought to be instigated by the owner of the land, whose interests would be enhanced thereby. Very soon after J. K. Lamerick was appointed brigadier general, and displaced Williams in the chief command, the latter retaining his rank of colonel of the second regiment, subordinate to Limerick. The new selection does not seem to have been a very happy one; it was made at a time when much dissatisfaction existed against Limerick, instigated, probably, by the speculative clique, and to add to his embarrassments, the period of enlistment of many men had come to an end, and these were receiving their discharges. The work of reorganizing the forces was very difficult. Most of the former captains and subordinate officers were prejudiced against the new general, and many of these declined to serve under him. The inaction of the troops through the winter had given ample opportunity for political manipulators and others to bias the minds of the troops as they chose, and those small politicians looked upon the war as affording a satisfactory opportunity to urge their claims for preferment.
    By the middle of February two-thirds of the men had received their discharges, and the diminution of the necessary guards made it unsafe, we are told, for anybody to travel alone. Indians were seen repeatedly at points before deemed free from them, and alarm was felt lest there be a repetition of the sad tragedies of the preceding autumn. In this state of affairs General Lamerick removed the headquarters of the regiment again to Vannoy's, deeming that a more suitable place than the retired glades of Forest Dale. In February the companies of Bailey, Keeney, Gordon and Lewis received their final discharge, and those of O'Neal, Sheffield, Abel George, Bushey, M. M. Williams, Wallan, Robertson and Barnes were enlisted. Of these, Abel George and M. M. Williams had commanded companies attached to the ninth regiment in the preceding fall, but being mustered out, along with numerous others, they had entered the service again at the date named. It was thought that it would be difficult to induce a sufficient number of men to enter the service, but these anticipations were met by the reenlistment of nearly every man of the discharged companies, and within a few days a sufficient force had been raised to meet all wants.
    The weather continued unpropitious for military movements throughout the months of February and March, and whatever strategical operations were then resolved upon by General Lamerick were not carried out. The companies remained in winter quarters, guarding suspected localities and taking care of themselves. No incidents of much importance occurred during the time, the Indians remaining mostly at their old haunts upon the lower river, until weary of waiting to be attacked. They made disconnected attempts at robbery on sundry occasions, wherever arms or ammunition were to be obtained, but there is no record of serious loss of life from these raids, until the famous one of March twenty-fifth, when Evans' pack train was robbed, and the battle of Eight Dollar Mountain was fought.
   
    Subsequent to the events just detailed, a transaction of considerable importance took place at the reservation across the river from Fort Lane. This was the removal of Chief Sam's band to the Coast Reservation west of the Willamette. It was mentioned in treating of the Indian outbreak of the ninth of October that the Table Rock band took no part in those proceedings. On the contrary, the members of that band crossed the river to Fort Lane and besought the protection of Captain Smith, assuring him of their peaceful feelings and deprecating the possible and ever-probable violence of the white settlers, which, but for such protection, would surely have befallen them. During the succeeding months they remained under the immediate care of Captain Smith and Agent Ambrose (successor of Culver), and gave not the remotest cause for suspicion on the part of the whites. Chief Joe, celebrated as the foremost member of the Rogue River tribe, was dead. For a long time he had wielded with his brother the divided authority of the tribe. He had been eminent in council; he was not a despicable enemy in battle. He died at his lodge at the lower end of Big Bar not long after the Lane treaty was signed. Notwithstanding the loss of their wisest counselor, the band remained true to the agreements made in 1853, and with a striking devotion to their word, refrained entirely from giving aid or countenance to the hostiles, in spite of the utmost inducements to a contrary course. The whole annals of Indian wars have nothing more admirable than the truth and firmness with which these sorely troubled yet constant barbarians maintained the honor of their obligations. Finally, when the Bureau of Indian Affairs had decided to remove all the natives from Southern Oregon, the Table Rock band--being with the Umpquas the only Indians accessible to authority--were sent to the permanent reservation about Yaquina Bay. Such was the state of public sentiment that a guard of one hundred soldiers was deemed necessary in order to protect this little remnant on their progress northward. And this, notwithstanding the fact that by their friendship for the whites, they had incurred the enmity of all the hostile Indians on Rogue River. The people of the Willamette, jealous of the removal of such celebrated warriors into their neighborhood, and scarce understanding the situation of affairs, called loudly for the citizens to raise an armed force to resist their coming and exterminate them, but the excitement soon calmed, and the Indians found a final home by the shores of the Pacific.
    Equally illustrative of the tone of public feeling was a circumstance which happened about the middle of February, a little time subsequent to the departure of the Table Rock band. At this time Chiefs Limpy and George, with about thirty warriors, well armed and mounted on horses, some of which carried two braves and others three, came up from the Meadows carrying flags of truce, and camped on the reservation opposite Fort Lane. They sent a messenger to Captain Smith to announce their arrival and desire for a talk. Their object was not to make peace, but to secure the surrender of some squaws who were in the hands of the agent. The news of their arrival got abroad instantly, and the various volunteer companies assembled at Forest Dale in haste, no one yet understanding the circumstances, but all inquiring as to the purpose of the invasion. Messengers went to the fort and were informed that the regulars would not allow the Indians to be molested in consequence of their coming under a flag of truce, as these same Indians had respected that symbol on a certain occasion. The law of nations and the regular army prevailed in spite of threat, and the savages returned unmolested to their lair. The Sentinel published a fiery editorial against the United States troops, and refused to be pacified. "We are informed by Major Bruce that Captain Smith said that if anyone fired upon the Indians, he would return the fire. We would ask if our citizen soldiery are to be intimidated by the threat of anyone from avenging the innocent blood that these savages have caused to flow?" This sort of rhetoric did the Indians no hurt, but it proved very expensive to those who furnished army supplies.
    Returning to our main subject, we find that the Illinois Indians, previously at the Indian encampment at the Meadows on Rogue River, had become tired of the monotony of life sufficiently to induce them to make trips to their old hunting grounds in search of plunder and excitement. On the twelfth of February they killed John Guess in his field on Deer Creek, leaving him dead in the furrow. On the morning of March 24, news came to Vannoy's that the enemy had ambushed and killed two travelers, Wright, Vannoy's partner, and Private Olney, of O'Neal's company, who were encamped at the foot of Eight Dollar mountain, and that the attacking party had at a later hour met another party consisting of five men, and mortally wounded John Davis. Orders were at once sent by Major Bruce to the various companies of his battalion to repair instantly to Fort Vannoy. Captain Hugh O'Neal, who with his company was nearest to the scene of action, had immediately set out for Hay's ranch, or Fort Hay, as it was called, hoping to reach there before the Indians could do so, as that post had but few defenders. A sharp skirmish ensued when within a few hundred yards of the post and Private Caldwell was mortally wounded, and some pack mules loaded with provisions etc., were taken by the Indians, who besieged the fort after the volunteers had taken refuge within it. The enemy abandoned the ground during the night, and returning along the road southward, met and attacked Evans' pack train which was coming from Crescent City. They killed a Mexican packer, and wounded "Big Dave." Evans escaped to Reeves' farm, but the mules and packs were all captured by the marauders, who gained a large amount of ammunition by the capture. On receiving the news of this late attack, Lieutenant Colonel W. W. Chapman (recently elected to that office) ordered Major Bruce to attack the enemy with all his available force. There were perhaps 125 men who proceeded under the Major's orders to the scene of Evans' misfortune.
    The foremost of these engaged the enemy while yet the remainder were dismounting. All horses were left at the foot of the hill which it was necessary to ascend to find the enemy, and a long line of battle, reaching several hundred yards along the side of the mountain, was formed and the troops advanced up the rise. Private Collins led the way up but was shot dead when near the top, falling in the road. John McCarty was also shot, dying soon after, and Private Phillips was mortally wounded. Abel George's men dismounted, and tying their horses to a fence, started up hill on the side next Deer Creek, intending to outflank the Indians, while Captain M. M. Williams engaged them in front, assisted by members of Alcorn, Rice's (Miller's) and other companies. Major Bruce with about fifty men kept along the road to the place where Collins fell. The battle was now a lively one; the rattle of rifles and revolvers was almost continuous, and frequent attempts were made by each party to charge the other. All sought cover, and there was little chance for life for the man who neglected thus to protect himself. At this interesting juncture a shout was raised that the Indians were making off with the horses, left at the foot of the hill. A number of the savages, spying the condition of affairs ran hastily to the spot and mounting some and leading others, escaped with some fifteen of the animals belonging to Abel George's Yreka company.
    The most of the fighting for a time was done by M. M. Williams and about a score of his bravest men, who stood their ground valiantly, and only retreated when the Indians had nearly or quite surrounded them. Alcorn's men and others fought well also, but the general applause was marred by the conduct of a great many who either ran away during the fight, or else could not be brought into it at all. Over 200 men were within sound of the firing, but not one half that number took any part in the fight, and probably not over fifty engaged in it with energy and resolution. A hundred or more of the readiest fighters ever known among the Indians of this continent held with determination the hill and the thick woods and successfully barred the way. Against this force the volunteers effected nothing. Shortly they began to retire, and gaining the base of the hill, they mounted and returned to Fort Hay, hardly yet sensible of a defeat. The Indians withdrew in their characteristic manner, and hostilities for the time were over.
    Lieutenant Colonel Chapman now established a permanent camp at Fort Hay, making it the headquarters of the companies of Alcorn, George, O'Neal, Wilkinson and Williams, and of himself, Major Bruce and Regimental Surgeon Douthitt.
    On the eighteenth of March, 1856, an election was held in the various camps of the second regiment, and John Kelsay became colonel of the regiment in place of Williams; W. W. Chapman succeeded W. J. Martin as. lieutenant colonel, and James Bruce and W. L. Latshaw were elected majors of the two battalions. The respective positions of the battalions remained unchanged or nearly so, that of Bruce being stationed in the Illinois and Rogue River valleys, while that of Latshaw occupied various posts in the southern part of Douglas County, notably Fort Sheffield, so-called, on Cow Creek, a post in Camas, Fort Leland, on Grave or Leland Creek, Fort Relief and other points considered to be of strategical importance. The total force of the second regiment, as appears by the rolls, was 807 noncommissioned officers and men, commanded by fifty-one commissioned officers inclusive of the staff.
    With a portion of this force General Lamerick set out in April for an active campaign to the Big Meadows, on Rogue River, then recognized as the rallying point and base of supplies of the entire horde of hostiles, known to number at least 250 and popularly supposed to be twice as numerous. Having collected all his available force at the mouth of the Applegate, the General appointed a day of parade, and fixed upon the fourteenth of April as the day for setting out upon the proposed expedition. On the morning of that day the army set out, under the immediate command of Lieutenant Colonel Chapman, who proceeded in advance with one hundred men, guided by the scouts of Lewis and Bushey. A very long pack train came next, and Major Bruce brought up the rear with the remaining volunteers. A herd of beef cattle was driven along as a part of the commissariat, to be drawn upon as occasion required, and ample provision had been made for anticipated emergencies, even to supplying a couple of canvas boats, portable and collapsible, to be used in crossing the river. Shovels for constructing roads were supplied, and twenty-five days' rations were taken, besides 100 rounds of ammunition for each soldier. General Lamerick announced his intention to remain out until the Indians were completely conquered, or until the army had to return for provisions.
    The southern battalion marched down the south side of Rogue River, and in two or three days reached Peavine Mountain, some twelve miles from the Little Meadows of Rogue River, the objective point of Colonel Kelsay's command. This latter division fitted out at Fort Leland, on Grave Creek, and set out on or about the seventeenth of April and arrived safely at their destination within two or three days, having come via Whiskey Creek. No enemy was met upon the route, but shortly after halting at the end of their march the pickets were fired upon by concealed Indians, whom a diligent search failed to discover. The country over which each detachment passed was thoroughly "scoured" by large numbers of scouts, and Indian "sign" in abundance was found, but the wily savages retired secretly before the army, and made no stand. On April twenty-seventh, [two] men, [McDonough Harkness] and Wagoner, express riders between Lamerick's command and Fort Leland, were attacked by Indians at Whiskey Creek, and Harkness, a partner of James Twogood, in the Leland Creek House (otherwise called the Grave Creek House), was killed. His body was found horribly mutilated.
    Captain Barnes, of the spy company, reconnoitered during the halt at the Little Meadows, and found the Indians in large numbers, scattered in the rough, mountainous and brushy country between the camp and the Big Meadows, which lie below the Little Meadows, and also the north side of the river. Major Bruce being communicated with, his battalion was ordered up, and he joined forces with Colonel Kelsay, the total force gathered there being 535 officers and men. The camp was on a high bench or terrace, two miles north of the river and a thousand feet above it. A breastwork of pine trees was formed, enclosing a space sufficient for camping purposes, and there being an abundance of grass and water near, the locality was well adapted for that purpose. The Indian encampment was found to be on a large bar on the south side of the river and some three miles below. The Big Meadows were deserted by them, and the intervening country contained none except those doing duty as scouts. On the twenty-third Colonel Kelsay with 150 men made a reconnaissance toward a suspected point, but without results, and on the same day Major Bruce at the head of a like force started to descend the slope toward the bar. At a distance of a mile from camp a creek was arrived at, beyond which were collected a considerable number of Indians, but these being beyond rifle range, and Major Bruce's instructions not allowing him to attack, no fighting was done, and the detachment, having plainly seen the Indian village on the bar, returned to camp. During the following days until the twenty-seventh, considerable reconnoitering was done, and a brush with the enemy took place, without result. The Indians were thought to number several hundred, including women and children, and were found to be as actively employed in scouting as were the whites themselves.
    At a council of war ordered by General Lamerick it was resolved to attack the enemy in his stronghold on the bar, and to do this effectually and at the same time prevent the Indians from escaping over the mountains in their rear, Major Bruce was ordered to cross to the south side of the river and march to a point where they could be intercepted in case of flight. The other battalion under Colonel Kelsay in person was to proceed westward from the encampment, and gaining the summits opposite the Indians' position, was then to march down the steep declivity directly in their front and attack them from across the river. The southern battalion duly arrived at the point where they were to cross, but the two canvas boats being launched, the men declined to enter them, alleging that the Indians might easily sink them by rifle shots, or failing in that, might massacre the few who would be able to land. Major Bruce's authority was insufficient to compel them to obedience, and the plan was abandoned. It does not appear that any Indians had been seen by the battalion on their march to the river, nor does it seem likely that any considerable number of them, if any, were in the neighborhood, their total force probably having been at that hour at their rendezvous on the bar, three miles below. This is a fair example of the difficulties met with by the officers at that time. Such a state of insubordination prevailed that it rendered all plans nugatory. Every private thought himself entitled to reason upon his superior officer's commands, and to refuse compliance if they seemed injudicious. Under such circumstances it is no wonder that such a large force accomplished so little.
    Major Bruce, being compelled to remain on the north side of the river, concluded to move downstream and join Colonel Kelsay at the bar. Meanwhile, this commander had reached a point on the declivity nearly opposite his objective point, and started directly downhill, following a ridge which afforded comparatively little obstruction to his advance. In this he was much favored by a heavy fog which rested upon the hills, utterly obscuring his every movement from the Indians. Thus he was enabled to arrive nearly at the river before they discovered his whereabouts. The detachment was now formed in order of battle, and all rushed down and took position on the bank of the river facing the Indian encampment on the bar, and opened a continuous fire upon the enemy. The savages were thrown into confusion by the sudden attack, and did not return the fire for some time. The women and children, the former carrying heavy packs, soon left the camp and passed up the hill toward the Illinois River, while the greater part of the males sought shelter in the edge of the fir woods behind their encampment, and watched the movements of the whites. Major Bruce arrived with his command and, taking a position on the left of the northern battalion, began firing at the enemy, who, however, were in positions of comparative safety. Desultory and ineffectual firing was kept up all day, but no means of crossing the river being at hand, nothing could be done to complete the victory. It is supposed that quite a number of Indians were killed, while the only loss to the whites was the severe wounding of Elias Mercer, of Wilkinson's company, who, on being removed to Roseburg, died upon the way. John Henry Clifton also sustained a severe wound, but recovered.
    In the evening the whole force went into camp at the Big Meadows, on the north side of the river and six miles below the former camp. On the following morning Colonel Kelsay and Major Latshaw with 150 men went to a point on the river two miles below the bar, with the expectation of crossing to the south side and "scouring" the country thereabouts. At the same time Lieutenant Colonel Chapman with 100 men marched to the battleground of the previous day to engage the enemy if they were still there, with the object of diverting their attention from the movement below. The former command found Indians scattered along the shore, who showed fight and "moved further into the brush and set up a considerable hallowing," consequently the detachment did not cross. The casualties of the day were, as might be judged, very light. A private of Sheffield's company was wounded, and one or two Indians were thought to be hit, but the latter is very doubtful. About twelve o'clock the Indians "withdrew beyond range of our guns, and deeming it impracticable to cross the river at this point we drew off the command and returned to camp." Lieutenant Colonel Chapman had found no Indians at the bar, so he returned, probably also thinking it impracticable to cross. Major Bruce had "scoured" in the direction of John Mule Creek with 100 men, and he also returned unharmed.
    On the twenty-ninth Captain Crouch, with his company, left for Roseburg, via Camas, to escort the wounded to the hospital. The remainder of the regiment broke camp and occupied the bar where the Indian encampment had stood, and met with no resistance in so doing. The scouts reported that the Indians had all left the vicinity and that the remains of seventy-five camp fires existed on the mountain side above the bar, making the spot where they encamped on the night following Colonel Kelsay's attack. On the thirteenth the command remained at the bar on account of bad weather, and Captain Lewis' spies reported that the Indians had gone down the river. "The provisions now being nearly exhausted, and the weather continuing so unfavorable, it was considered impracticable to follow the enemy over the rough ground before us, which was covered with snow, and many of the soldiers were already nearly barefooted." On the first of May, the troops recrossed the river, Captains George and Bushey proceeded immediately to Grave Creek, while the rest camped at the Big Meadows, at a place selected as the site of a permanent fort. Williams, Wilkinson, Keith, Blakely and Barnes' companies were detailed to remain there, the remaining companies setting out for home the next day. Captains Sheffield and Noland with their men went to Roseburg via Camas, and Robertson, Wallan, Miller (Rice's), O'Neal, Alcorn and Lewis' companies marched to Fort Leland, the headquarters of the northern battalion, which they reached on the fourth of May.
    If we sum up the fruits of this, the Second Meadows Campaign, we shall find that they equal those of the first. To descend to details, we find that the army "scoured" a large tract of wild country, consumed twenty-five days' rations in two weeks, drove the Indians from their place on the bar to another place in some unknown region, and returned to civilization. It is useless to enter into any long explanations of why such slight results were attained. It must have been partly the insubordination of the troops, who while nominally under the command of their general, colonel, lieutenant colonel, four majors and unlimited captains and lieutenants, domineered shamefully over these officers and acted their own pleasure in times of emergency. It is difficult to understand why these individuals retained their commands under such discouraging circumstances, and why their own self-respect did not impel them to quit their charges in disgust. Some curious and amusing incidents, whose record has come down to us, will illustrate the spirit of insubordination which so injured the army's usefulness. After General Lamerick had planned the fight at the Meadows and had given Major Bruce the order to cross the river, one of the latter's men said, "Look here, Gen'ral; this ain't gwine ter do. Jest as sure as we cross thar, some of us will git hit. Don't yer know we got one man killed tryin' ter cross thar afore?" Rather more encouraging was a reply to one of Major Bruce's commands to charge, "Yes, We say charge, and we'll chalk you out a damned good charge, Major!" There is no question of the individual bravery of those men. As expressed by one who was among them--a coward had no chance. A more daring set could not have existed than these miners and settlers. Their experience had made them the most self-reliant men that the world contained. But the peculiar circumstances surrounding them, the fact of their officers being raised from the ranks and being consequently regarded as no better than anybody else, wonderfully impaired their efficiency and reliability.
David D. Fagan, History of Benton County, A. G. Walling, Portland 1885, pages 256-269


Henry Hill Woodward, Lyrics of the Umpqua, 1889, pages 2-3 Hill was a veteran of The Meadows.


Henry Hill Woodward, Lyrics of the Umpqua, 1889, page 41  Hill was a veteran of The Meadows


    Capt. M. M. Williams died in Lewiston last Friday morning. His life had been despaired of for two weeks, during which time he suffered severely, from gangrene resulting from erysipelas in the foot. He was born on the 5th of February, 1818, on the Atlantic Ocean aboard the American ship Newark, of which his father was master. The early years of his life were spent in travel. He visited nearly every civilized country on the globe. He was a millwright and mechanic as well as a practical sailor and worked at his trade in many countries. We have records of mills built by him in Spain and in China, in the latter place a five-stamp quartz mill.
    In 1849 he was on the eastern seacoast when he contracted the prevailing desire to go to California. An opportunity presented itself in a ship that lay at anchor condemned for the reason that it was infected with yellow fever. He secured this from the owner, secured a cargo and sailed for California around the Horn. He arrived in Golden Gate harbor when the gold fever ran highest. Capt. Williams' crew deserted him and soon he deserted the ship and left it anchored in the bay.
    He was then launched upon the career of a pioneer. He followed the fortunes of the gold camps, devoting his time chiefly to the work of engineering and building mills and machinery of many kinds. Between 1850 and 1862 he followed the trade of millwright and contractor very devotedly and faithfully. He built at last one mill for himself at Kerbyville, Oregon, which was destroyed by fire in 1857. In this fire he lost some valuable papers and among them the title to a Spanish land grant, which loss occasioned a later visit to Spain in a vain effort to repair his loss.
    In all he built thirty-four flour mills on the Pacific Coast, the one at Lapwai which he built for the government in 1862 being the last.
    In June 1853 while Capt. Williams was engaged in mining and mechanical work in Southern Oregon the Rogue River Indians became so troublesome that war was declared against them. This tribe was the most murderous, treacherous and at the same time bravest Indians on the Pacific Coast. They are supposed to have committed a thousand murders between the year of 1850 and 1856. [The opposite would be more accurate.] It was in the exciting times when the mines of that country were in their glory and people were reckless of life as well as property. The country was most favorable to Indian depredations; and the bleached bones of the unfortunate were strewn unnamed throughout a vast district. Finally the miners left their shovels and their sluices and began a war of extermination. Capt. Williams distinguished himself at the battle of Evans Creek, where Gen. Lane was wounded. He supported a cavalry charge with his company of infantry under a fearful fire, his men following him encouraged by the confidence he inspired. He was instrumental in effecting a treaty with this fierce tribe and they were placed upon the Table Rock Reservation in charge of Capt., now Gen. A. J. Smith of Washington, D.C., a retired officer. He went back to his work on Applegate Creek. The Indians grew restless again and in 1855 broke out into open warfare. Capt. Williams mustered the first company for this war and was second to report to the Governor for service. Company B of Oregon Volunteers with Capt. M. M. Williams at the head was the most active in the battles of Table Rock, Applegate Creek, Slate Creek, Hungry Hill and Meadows. At the latter place the Indians surrendered and the most powerful tribe on the coast was broken up. They were removed to distant reservations and are now almost extinct. Old John, the chief and general of the tribe, was taken by steamer to California and died at Benicia. [He died after his return to the reservation.] He never became  reconciled, but was belligerent to the end. On the ocean voyage to the military prison he was released from the shackles. He secured a capstan lever and began vigorous battle with the guard and ship's crew. He was with difficulty overpowered and placed in irons. He said if he had two of his warriors he would capture the "big canoe" and go back to his people.
    As incidents of this war it may be related that Capt. Williams was twice wounded. While leading a charge at Table Rock in a vain effort to dislodge the Indians he was shot in the leg with an arrow. The shaft was removed but the spear remained in the wound. The surgeon proposed to remove it but the captain protested against any operation that would disable him from participation in active warfare. He carried that arrowhead for thirty years and it was removed in this city ten years ago. [This sounds like a confusion with the experience of the similarly named L. L. Williams, who carried an arrow shaft until it worked its way out eight years later.] On another occasion the captain tried to ride down a warrior who resisted his advance. The native suddenly drew a big knife and made a thrust at the white foe. The captain threw himself over on the side of his horse and the savage cut a deep gash across his leg. While clinging to the side of his horse the captain reached under the horse's neck and cut the Indian down with a big knife. At the battle of the Meadows the volunteers became too eager and they were entrapped by the Indians. They were besieged and cut off from water. The Indians were fortified in a stockade of fallen trees and could not be dislodged. The whites received unexpected reinforcements after they had almost despaired.
    Between 1857 and 1860 Capt. Williams visited the Nile, Constantinople, Palestine and many other countries of historical interest. In nearly all of these countries he became identified with their industries by directing engineering and architectural enterprises. He introduced improved milling machinery to many different peoples. In 1860 he was at the Dalles and started to Walla Walla and Lapwai. He accidentally fell and broke his leg at the beginning of the journey. He was treated by an army surgeon who reduced the fracture, but the mechanical skill of the patient led him to question the skill of the doctor. In due time he called a fellow mechanic to apply a practical test to the injured member in the way of measurement. The broken leg was an inch too short. The sufferer sent for the surgeon and instructed him to make the broken leg as long as the well one. The learned man of science protested, but to no purpose. The operation of lengthening the wounded leg was directed by the patient. He was placed in a harness and a pulley was attached to his foot. Force was applied by means of these appliances until the limit of measure was reached; and the sufferer never winced under the strain till the bones set in proper position.
    Capt. Williams related many experiences which illustrate the character of the man. At one time he had been following a squad of Indians and located them at night. An observation revealed the fact that the camp was very strong. In their security they slept soundly. The Captain crawled within their camp and stole their powder magazine and most of their guns and returned to his friends to await results. At the break of day the white men charged the Indians and in the confusion over the loss of their guns and ammunition they were driven into the river and nearly annihilated. Again the Captain was ordered by the officer of the day, John C. Kelsay, to cross Rogue River on a raft with his men under a deadly fire. This order he refused to obey. Another company went upon the raft and only five men returned alive. They were shot down by the Indians in ambush.
    Since 1863 the subject of this sketch has been an active business man in this city. He was ever scrupulously exact in his dealing, always independent and upright. Though his prejudices were strong he was a constant friend to those who retained his confidence, He was deficient in diplomacy as a tradesman but he was generally successful in his undertakings. He died the possessor of a competency and is mourned by business associates here. He leaves a daughter and a grandson in this city who have been associated with him in business for a year and a half.
Lewiston Tiller, Lewiston, Idaho, March 18, 1897, page 5


    Early in the spring of 1856, a number of companies of troops were sent to the "Meadows" down Rogue River, where it was known the Indians had gone out of our reach, as they fondly hoped. We fought them a number of times, but since the river intervened it was difficult to know just how many we may have killed. Our loss was very light. One day a detachment was taken from the different companies to reconnoiter the enemy. To reach them it was a very difficult matter, on account of the deep canyons, and the rough country to be crossed. The Indians were found, but it not being thought best to bring on an engagement at that time, a few shots were fired and the retreat ordered. When camp was reached and the roll called, it was found that one of Company B's men, F. M. Splawn, was missing. Volunteers were at once called for, and many responded at once, but by the time that preparations were made for the return, it was too late in the day. It was the intention to make the search early next morning, but almost before day dawned the camp was aroused to a wonderful degree by the guard calling out, "Splawn's in camp!" and the good news was repeated, "Splawn's in camp!" Sure enough, there was the same brave Frank that we had all mourned as dead. Each one was anxious to learn the particulars of his escape. When the retreat was ordered Frank, as usual, was in front, and did not learn till later that he was left to fight the savages alone. In order to avoid, if possible, the shots of the Indians that were in plain sight of him, he took refuge in some bushes which were riddled for a while with the deadly missiles intended for the brave soldier. Here he remained until night, when he escaped from his hiding place without any injury. After traveling all night over the roughest ground imaginable, he reached camp as above related just at daylight, but but it was weeks before he overcame his rough adventure.
    War incidents would not be complete without an occasional anecdote, and the following was told on Capt. Jonathan Keeney, to the writer by Gen. McCarver, at that time our quartermaster general. It seems that the captain wanted to procure some provisions for his men and applied to the commissary in charge in vain for them. This enraged the old man, who at once sought an interview with Gen. McCarver. After making known his wants the General informed him that if he would make out a requisition it should be filled. "To Sheol with your 'inquisitions'," was his answer; but his wants was supplied.
    It has been said that no person ever saw a dead mule, but when going from Fort Leland to the Meadows, over the narrow trail, one of those hardy animals loaded with a canvas boat that we had expected to use in crossing Rogue River, owing probably to having but one eye, lost its footing and end over end descended the mountainside into the deep canyon. "Too dead to skin," was the laconic reply of one of the boys who climbed down to see the result of the fall.
    On the 25th of April, 1856, McDonough Harkness, and another man whose name is forgotten, left Fort Leland for the Meadows. [The other man was Jacob Wagoner, whose wife had been famously killed in the breakout of 1855.] When but a few miles from our camp they were shot at from ambush, and Harkness was killed, tho other man escaping. The most horrible sight we witnessed during the entire campaign was when his body, stark naked and mutilated in the most shocking manner, was brought into camp on a pack mule in charge of Captain Crouch's company.
Samuel Handsaker, "Then and Now," Eugene Guard, October 23, 1899, page 1 and October 24, 1899, page 3



T. A. Wood, Grand Commander Indian War Veterans--Dear Sir:
    Captain James Blakely's company (D), second recruiting battalion, O.M.V., was enlisted at Brownsville, in Linn County, on the 28th day of March, 1856, and was ordered to Corvallis to be mustered in, but on arriving there they were ordered to Eugene for that purpose, where they were mustered into the service of the Territory of Oregon on April 4, and, after waiting quite a while for transportation for camp equipage, were sent to the Big Meadows, on Rogue River, by way of Roseburg and Camas Prairie. In the meantime, however, the two companies of Captains Keith and Blakely, in accordance with the governor's instructions, elected a major, E. L. Massey being elected to that office. While on the way to Rogue River commissions were forwarded to the company officers, but none to Major Massey; but, instead, an order from someone for the senior captain to take command of the two companies. This caused considerable dissatisfaction, as Major Massey was much more popular among the men than Captain Keith. (Major Massey told the writer some years afterwards that he found his commission at Salem on his return from the service.)
    The two companies got to the Big Meadows on the evening of the last day of General Lamerick's fight with the Indians.
    Here they were ordered, with some other companies, to build a stockade fort, which they proceeded to do by digging a trench and setting poles on end therein. The two companies before named, with a few men from a number of other companies, remained here for some time before taking any active part in the campaign.
    The fort was called Meadows Fort by the volunteers; in history, Fort Lamerick. During the stay here Lieutenants Cox and Riggs, with detachments from Keith's and Blakely's companies, were sent to Camas Prairie to escort a pack train, with supplies for the men.
    On page 412 of Mrs. Victor's history there is an account, purporting to have been written by Captain Wallen, of some campaigning, in which Captain Blakely's company took rather an active part, though they are not mentioned at all.
     The statement is made that on the 27th, the day on which Smith was attacked, "Wallen's command came upon a camp of the hostiles, which fled before him without firing a gun," etc. Having been along with the command, and a participant in the proceedings of the day, I will give a short account of the affair.
    The Indian camp mentioned was on the south side of the river, and when it was found where they were, Major Massey ordered Lieutenant Riggs to take a detachment of Captain Blakely's company and make a detour around and come in below the camp, while the main force should follow the trail (Captain Wallen commanding), which passed through a low gap in the ridge, and come down opposite the camp. Lieutenant Riggs, on reaching his position, saw the Indians about their camp, some bathing in the river, utterly oblivious to any impending danger. Imagine his surprise when, instead of seeing the command filing along the trail, he beheld it on a high bluff in full view of the camp, when the Indians disappeared as if by magic. I never could imagine why the troops were ordered to take that course. It looked very much like it was done purposely to give the Indians a chance to escape. That certainly was the outcome, at any rate.
    Further on, the historian says: "Two days later, on the 29th," the command was surprised while resting under some trees at the noon halt by some of John's band, while retreating from the battlefield, and H. C. Huston, of Keith's company, wounded. We were at the time of the attack about two miles below our camp on a point in a bend in the river, and had been there all the forenoon, and having found an Indian canoe there, Lieutenant Riggs was ordered across the river, with 20 of Blakely's company, to reconnoiter, and was over the ground from which the Indians fired on us. There were two decrepit old squaws sitting on the bank of the river, being the only Indians seen at the time. Six of the men wandered off up the river, when the rest recrossed. About noon Lieutenant Riggs was again ordered to cross the river and travel up to and recross at the camp, and, while preparing to do so, the Indians fired on us, when the order was countermanded, and Captain Nolan ordered over. They crossed the river below the enemy, and the six of Captain Blakely's company, hearing the firing ran down from above, when the Indians doubtless thought they were being surrounded, and left the field.
    Subsequently, Keith's and Blakely's companies went to the mouth of Rogue River, and there Lieutenant Riggs was sent to Port Orford to escort a pack train after supplies for the command. As the Indians were surrendering and the war was over, the two companies were ordered to Port Orford, and from there back to the Meadows and home.
    Captain Blakely sent an express to inform the citizens of Linn County that he would be at Brownsville, where the company was enlisted, on the 4th of July, where we were met by our wives and children and friends, who had prepared a bountiful repast for us.
Oregon Native Son, Portland, July 1899, pages 158-159


    Early in the spring of 1856 a number of companies of troops were sent to the Meadows, down Rogue River, where it was known the Indians had gone out of our reach, as they fondly hoped. We fought them a number of times, but since the river intervened it was difficult to know just how many we may have killed. Our loss was very light. One day a detachment was taken from the different companies to reconnoiter the enemy. To reach them was a very difficult matter, on account of the deep canyons and the rough country to be crossed. The Indians were found, but it not being thought best to bring on an engagement at that time, a few shots were fired and the retreat ordered. When camp was reached and the roll called it was found that one of Company B's men, F. M. Splawn, was missing. Volunteers were at once called for, and many responded at once, but by the time the precautions were made for the return, it was too late in the day. It was the intention to make the search early next morning, but almost before dawn the camp was aroused to a wonderful degree by the guard's calling out, "Splawn's in camp!" and the good news was repeated, "Splawn's in camp!" Sure enough, there was the same brave Frank that we had all mourned as dead. Each one was anxious to learn the particulars of his escape. When the retreat was ordered, Frank, as usual, was in front, and did not learn, till later, that he was left to fight the savages alone. In order to avoid, if possible, the shots of the Indians, who were in plain sight of him, be took refuge in some bushes, which were riddled for awhile with the deadly missiles intended for the brave soldier. Here he remained until night, when he escaped from his hiding place without any injury. After traveling all night over the roughest ground imaginable, he reached camp as above related just at daylight, but it was weeks before he overcame his rough adventure.
    On April 25, 1856, McDonough Harkness, and another man, whose name is forgotten, left Fort Leland for the Meadows. When but a few miles from our camp they were shot at from ambush and Harkness was killed, the other man escaping. The most horrible sight we witnessed during the entire campaign was when his body, stark naked and mutilated in the most shocking manner, was brought into camp on a pack mule in charge of Captain Crouch's company.
"Southern Oregon Indian War," Oregon Native Son, Portland, volume 2, May 1900-April 1901, page 195


    In 1855, when General Curry called for volunteers, runners were sent out from Brownsville to notify the settlers. Mr. [Harvey] Robbins was plowing on his place in Linn County when the messenger told him of the need for volunteers. He unhooked his team from the plow, threw the harness over the plow, and turned the horses loose on the prairie. Going to a friend's home, two miles distant, he bought a saddle horse, and he and his friend started at once to where the volunteers were assembling. By 10 o'clock next morning 110 young men had signed the roll in Captain John Keeney's company, each furnishing his own horse, gun, ammunition and blankets.
    They started south, passing through Eugene and on toward the Rogue River Valley. When they came to the Cow Creek canyon they found most of the houses of the settlers in ashes. Just beyond Cow Creek they came to where the Indians had killed a man named Bailey, who was freighting supplies to California. The Indians had burned his wagons, killed his oxen and mutilated the bodies of Mr. Bailey and his drivers. Five volunteers, of whom Mr. Robbins was one, were sent ahead as an advance guard. Presently they heard gunfire and, upon advancing, discovered a stage station was being attacked by the Indians. [There was no stage service south of the Canyon in 1855.] The Indians, seeing reinforcements coming, retreated.
    A few days later Company C, of which Harvey Robbins was a member, went on down the Old California Trail to a roadhouse on Grave Creek, where Captain Keeney called for volunteers to follow and locate the Indians. Harvey Robbins was one of the 12 men to volunteer. They followed the Indians' trail to Whiskey Creek, where they were joined next day by the rest of the troops. They were joined a day or two later by a company of volunteers from Lane County, commanded by Captain Laban Buoy. The men were ordered to construct rafts, but while doing so were surprised by the Indians, and at the first volley one of the volunteers was killed and two badly wounded. The officers decided it would be unwise to attack a superior force of Indians, and in view of the fact that a heavy snow fell that night, they went back to their former camp on Grave Creek.
     Captain Keeney decided to return with his company to Linn County, thinking to continue the campaign the next spring. On February 1 the volunteers were called together at Brownsville by the first sergeant, the captain having been deprived of his commission for disbanding the company. The members of Company C were given honorable discharges. Mr. Robbins and his comrade, with whom he had stayed all winter, received their discharges in the afternoon and started at once for Salem. They volunteered there in Company D of Oregon Mounted Volunteers. They marched to Portland, thence to the Sandy River, and on up to The Dalles. From The Dalles they went to the Walla Walla Valley.
Fred Lockley, "Impressions and Observations of the Journal Man," Oregon Journal, Portland, March 19, 1927, page 4