Also see our Socialists, Beesons and W. J. Dean.

    MR. EDITOR:--Not long ago an argument, written by Dr. Hammett [physician George A. Hammett of Providence, Rhode Island], in reply to Mr. Salyards, appeared in the Investigator, to which I call the especial attention of your readers. It is as follows: "Adaptation, uncaused by intelligence, must have always existed, upon the Deist's own showing; since God must in his nature be adapted to act upon matter." Having thus proved that adaptation has always existed, uncaused by intelligence, he concludes--"Therefore, there is no God."
    The fallacy of the above reasoning consists in the non-distribution of the middle term (adaptation). The meaning is that some adaptations are uncaused and eternal; not that all are, for the adaptation of the eye to the nature of light is not eternal. Geology shows a period when no SUCH adaptations existed, and the atmosphere existed prior to the lungs of man, or the wings of birds, and children are born every day with eyes adapted to the light and feet adapted to go upon the earth's surface, who had no existence six years ago. These are but recent examples of adaptation as well as the race itself.
    Let us then reduce the above argument to the regular form, and see if it will fall asunder, or cohere together.
    Major premise--Some adaptations are eternal and uncaused by intelligence;
    Minor premise--The human eye, or hand, or leg, or foot, is an example of adaptation;
    Conclusion--Therefore the adaptation of the eye, hand, foot, &c., was uncaused by intelligence.
    The conclusion does not follow necessarily from the premises; the term (adaptation) being applied only to a part of the predicate.
    Here is a similar example of "non-distribution" (and as an argument equally conclusive as the above), viz.:
    Now, there are uncaused adaptations in the universe. Example--Space is adapted to contain matter; this is an example of eternal uncaused adaptation. Again--God's intelligence is ADAPTED to organize matter; this also is another example of uncaused adaptation. But does it follow that any other example which caprice may select is also equally eternal and UNCAUSED? Does it follow that the eye is also an eternal uncaused adaptation?
    But perhaps the writer only intended to insist that all natural adaptations are uncaused by intelligence, since many of them are not eternal, and many of them have a cause. This is narrowing down the issue wonderfully! and putting only the naked question of intelligence under debate. The proposition would stand thus: "All natural adaptations are uncaused by intelligence." Now what proof has ever yet been offered to establish this affirmative? One, two, or three examples of uncaused adaptation shed no light upon it, since a cause is admitted. No example of eternal adaptation will establish it, since it is admitted that these adaptations are not eternal (at least many of them). The only proof admissible would be to adduce examples of adaptations, HAVING A CAUSE, BUT NOT AN INTELLIGENT CAUSE. Give us the examples and we yield. To assert that the eye or hand is such an example is a plain petitio principii, or assumption of the point in debate. The point made by Mr. Salyards is about this, namely: The steel trap and the lion's jaws are both mechanical adaptations, and the end or use of each is to CATCH AND HOLD; this end or use was designed in case of the trap. Were not the lion's jaws also designed to catch and hold? But the trap is a mental conception, suggested to man by the lion's jaws. Are not the lion's jaws also the result of mental conception, or of God?
    Some adaptations impress the causality of man with the idea of cause, while other adaptations do not thus impress our minds. The adaptation of space to matter raises no idea, conception, feeling, or sentiment of a cause; while all mechanical arrangements, as well as some other arrangements, do thus impress the mind. All such adaptations as produce the notion of an intelligent cause HAVE also an intelligent cause, so far as experience has discovered their causes.
    Yours, truly,    HIRAM COLVER.
    Rogue River Valley, Oregon Territory, April, 1856.
Boston Investigator, June 18, 1856, pages 1-2   The motto of the Investigator was "Devoted to the Development and Promotion of Universal Mental Liberty."

    MR. EDITOR:--There are as vague ideas in the world concerning the word "reason," as the word "adaptation." As an example, take the following from Dr. Hammett:
    "Some men cannot leap the ocean";
    A is a man;
    Therefore, A cannot leap the ocean.
    This, says Dr. Hammett, is "correct reasoning," although not in "FORM" a regular syllogism. Doubtless the conclusion (that A cannot leap the ocean) is true; but does that truth follow necessarily from the premise? If not, though the conclusion be true, the reasoning is false.
    Here is a similar example:
    Some men are Atheists (major),
    Dr. Hammett is a man (minor),
    Therefore, Dr. Hammett is an Atheist (conclusion).
    Here the conclusion (that Dr. H. is an Atheist), although true, does in no way follow from the premise, and as an example of reasoning, is unsound. Again:
    Some adaptations are uncaused by intelligence;
    The eye is an example of adaptation;
    Therefore, the eye is uncaused by intelligence.
    This last is what Dr. Hammett calls "correct reasoning," although it lacks the "regular form." If this last is "correct reasoning," then also is the syllogism preceding it, concerning Dr. Hammett's Atheism. Dr. Hammett, I make no objection to your syllogism on account of "form"; the objection is, it cannot be made to wear the "regular form." All correct reasoning, however elliptically expressed, may and will reduce to the "regular form"--that is, to a syllogism in which the conclusion flows necessarily from the premise.
    Now the Doctor's major premise will always be, "Some adaptations are uncaused by intelligence"--a proposition in which the predicate is affirmed of only a part of the subject. He will not say all adaptations are uncaused by intelligence, since water and carding mills rise up to confront such a proposition. Nothing is proved, therefore, by combining his major and minor premise. And, though the world and its multiplied adaptations possibly may have no intelligent author, still such a conclusion does in no way follow from Dr. Hammett's premise.
    But, since the Dr. denies the reality of time, space, and "extended substance," he is perhaps beyond the arm of help, and with all my sympathy for him, I can do nothing. Permit me, however, to call his attention to the following consideration: Space is exquisitely adapted to contain the globe; now why confound this adaptation, which exists of eternal necessity, with other adaptations, which do not strike the mind as of necessary existence? The cow's udder, to me, seems intended as a reservoir for holding milk, the milk seems intended as food for the young animal, the teat intended for the calf to suck, and the hole in the teat for the milk to pass out of. I have an intuitive and abiding impression that design has been employed in this arrangement of matter, and how does Dr. Hammett relieve this impression? Why, thus: "Intelligence (that is God's intelligence) is exquisitely adapted to organize matter according to your own admission," "and this adaptation had no intelligent cause," and if one adaptation exist without an intelligent cause, why not the cow's udder exist without an intelligent cause?
    The reasoning would then stand thus (and the Dr. says it is correct reasoning):
    Some adaptations are uncaused by intelligence;
    A spinning-jack is an example of adaptation;
    Therefore, why is not a spinning-jack uncaused by intelligence?
    This, as an example of reasoning, is the same MENTAL PROCESS as that concerning the cow. We happen to know, that when applied to the spinning-jack, it does not conduct us to the truth. Why, then, rely upon it to conduct us to truth in the far more complicated and surpassing mechanism in Nature?
    Article 1st. Space and matter are eternal.
    2nd. Matter is of different kinds and qualities.
    3rd. Matter from all eternity had different qualities.
    4th. Intelligence is a quality of one of the kinds of matter.
    5th. Intelligent matter now exists.
    6th. Intelligent matter has always existed.
    7th. If there ever was a time when no intelligence existed in the universe, then no intelligence had existed.
    Still, believing in the reality of time, space, matter, extended substance, and Deity as intelligent matter, I remain a Deist, and think as the force of reason constrains me.
    Rogue River Valley, Sept. 1, 1856.
Boston Investigator, November 19, 1856, page 1

    "For if the most admirable adaptation which is attributed to a supposed Deity, does not indicate that he was produced by a designing cause, how utterly, how grossly absurd it is to infer that such a cause is indicated by the adaptation of a bird, a quadruped, or a man!"--[Dr. Hammett, Boston Investigator, Volume XXVI., No. 12. |
    The above intended argument is fraught with its own refutation, concealed, wrapped up, and implied. Let us see--"For if the most exquisite adaptation which is attributed to a supposed Deity [which adaptation by reason of its eternity can have no cause] does not indicate that he was produced by a designing cause, how utterly, how grossly absurd it is to infer that such a cause is indicated by the adaptation of a bird, a quadruped, or a man [all of which last mentioned adaptations are not eternal (like the other), and therefore have some cause or other]."
    The words in brackets are, of course, our own, and are used merely to bring to view that which is necessarily implied, though which might, if not expressed, be overlooked. Yet when thus filled up, the quotation, as an argument, loses its whole force. But Dr. Hammett admits that adaptations exist without an intelligent cause. I will therefore assume that a God, "exquisitely adapted," &c., does, or may exist, upon HIS own principle. His gun shoots one way as well as the other.
    Now, to argue that "Because eternal adaptations have no intelligent cause, therefore some of those adaptations that are not eternal have, likewise, no intelligent cause," is as though one should argue that, "because a horse wears hair, so does a gander"; or, as though Dr. Hammett should contend that Russell's threshing machine had no intelligent author, "because some eternal adaptations exist which have no intelligent authors, and which, from the nature of the case, could not have an author." Now the adaptation of space to matter is eternal, and could, therefore, have no cause; while the adaptation of man and beast is but recent (at least is conceded to have a beginning), and therefore a cause exists.
    I have shown, in a previous article, that Dr. Hammett's argument cannot be reduced to a regular syllogism, to which form all valid arguments may.
    The trouble with Atheism is, it cannot account for the origin of organized beings, plants, and animals. If the series of human beings does not extend back ad infinitum, then man originated "somehow." Indeed, geology shows a time prior to which man did not exist. Man, then, appeared by a miracle--that is, he came without the intervention of a pair of progenitors, as he now "comes."
    Granting the eternity of matter, and the eternity of all its known laws and properties, still the Atheist cannot get along; he must have organized beings to start with--to breed from. Give him these, and he then can account for their INCREASE; but their origin is incomprehensible.
    We know of the existence of only a little more than fifty elementary substances. Chemistry acquaints us with their properties, and also the nature of the known "imponderable agents." But these, none of them, have ever been observed to combine spontaneously and of their own inherent affinity into the form of a man, a cat, or a rhinoceros of one or two horns. A man must have more credulity than I have, to believe that the KNOWN forms of matter have inherent tendencies to combine into the form of an elephant or the seed of a "cocklebur."    HIRAM COLVER.
    Rogue River Valley (Oregon), March, 1857.
Boston Investigator, May 20, 1857, page 1

    "It is generally admitted," says Dr. H., "that in most cases syllogisms are useless." Answer--True; no one insists that an argument should always be stated in the syllogistic form; but everyone acquainted with the laws of mind knows that in all cases, when we reason in the strict sense of that term, the mental process which takes place, when expressed in words, is a syllogism. (See Whately's Logic.)
    Again--"That and the other stone fell, when unsupported. Therefore so will all stones fall when unsupported." This, says Dr. H., is the "Baconian method of reasoning by induction." Answer--There is no "Baconian method of reasoning" as distinguished from other "methods," as is supposed. The process of the mind is the same in every case of pure reasoning. Example--In every case where Dr. H. has reasoned, in the strict sense of the term, his mind (though he may not have noticed) passed through the following process, viz.
    "Nothing which exhibits adaptation alone can indicate a designing cause (major premise),
    The works of Nature exhibit adaptation alone (minor premise),
    Therefore, they cannot indicate an intelligent cause," (conclusion).
    Now, leave out either one of the premises, and you prove nothing. In the above syllogism, Dr. H. reasons correctly; that is, if you grant his major and minor, you cannot avoid the conclusion. But it so happens (as in most of Dr. H.'s arguments) that in the syllogism before us, both premises are false. Take the minor for example--"The works of Nature exhibit adaptation alone"--do they not also resemble the works of man? I do not insist that the resemblance is perfect out and out, neither does a beaver's dam nor a bird's nest resemble the works of man completely in every point throughout, but so nearly that none can doubt (though he never heard of a beaver) that the dam under examination is the work of intelligence: though he may doubt as to what GRADE of intellect to refer it.
    Do not the jaws of the carnivora resemble in structure and arrangement, in a high degree, the steel trap? Does not the hook upon the bat's wing resemble a fireman's hook? If man's works resemble those of Nature, surely those of Nature resemble those of man.
    Again, Dr. H. says of a machine--"We infer design not on account of adaptation alone, but because it differs from the works of Nature and thus resembles those of man." It seems then that adaptation alone, nor its resemblance to man's works alone, do the business for the Dr., but both combined! You do then give some weight to adaptation alone? Who does Dr. H. mean by the pronoun "we" in the above sentence? Not H. Colver? I protest; the remark does not apply to me. I infer intelligence, in such a case, from the order and arrangement of the parts of the machine, because experience has taught me that intelligence alone is capable of producing complicated order,* and this conclusion I have derived by that "BACONIAN METHOD" the Dr. spoke of.
    Secondly, I refer the machine to the class of human contrivances, from those characteristics peculiar to the works of man. Thus, the beaver's dam, I refer, 1st, to intelligence, from its order and arrangement; the tops of the trees being all downstream, and the limbs bracing in the mud, the roots make the dam, leaves stop the crevices, and mud seals the whole.
    2ndly, it must be referred to a grade of intellect inferior to man; because it lacks the peculiar characteristics which distinguish the works of that creature. So also, in regard to Nature's works, order and mechanism. Experience refers to intelligence. (Please remember that "Baconian method"--experience of "part of the facts.")
    3rdly, it must be referred to an order of intellect superior to man, because it is manufactured in a manner above man's comprehension, just as a mill is made in a manner above the comprehension of a beaver.
    Thus we see, 1st, order and arrangement is the peculiar offspring of intelligence; 2nd, each grade of intelligence leaves its own peculiar marks upon its work, by which we can distinguish its grade. Thus, the beaver leaves the marks of his teeth; man leaves the "score marks" and "juggles," while Deity works in a way as incomprehensible to us as the distiller's art of making whiskey is to a baboon or a wildcat.
    Mr. Editor, I would gladly point out the egregious blunders into which Dr. Hammett has fallen, in supposing that Bacon had discovered a DIFFERENT way of reasoning from Plato or Socrates! There is nothing of it.
    Bacon taught the folly of supposing or expecting to advance in the knowledge of Nature by pure reasoning unaided by experiment and observation. Bacon's "method" led him to believe in God.
    Rogue River Valley (Oregon), May 1, 1857.
----
    *I am not bound to maintain that everything in Nature evinces design; far from it.
Boston Investigator, June 10, 1857, page 1

    MR. EDITOR:--Any given conclusion may be traced back through the successive premises, and no conclusion can depend upon an infinite number of preceding premises. In mathematics we can trace any conclusion back to ultimate axioms, which are the foundations of our conclusions. These axioms, then, are not conclusions, as they do not follow from anything preceding. That "the whole is greater than its part" is not a conclusion, as Dr. Hammett would seem to intimate. In philosophy, these ultimate premises are not always self-evident, as in mathematics; and we should not call them conclusions, because they are not proved, but granted. For example, the maxim that "Nature will remain uniform in her operations" is the ultimate major premise upon which all philosophy rests. Yet it cannot be PROVED in any sense of that term; it is merely a postulate, or judgment, founded upon experience, yet not known by experience; we know absolutely nothing but the past by experience.
    Dr. H. seems to use the term "reason" to signify indiscriminately any act of intelligence. Experience informs us that Nature has been uniform in her operations for an indefinite period, and we expect she will so continue. We do not know she will; nor can we prove it. Indeed, if Atheism be true, Nature does NOT work in a uniform manner. She once produced man without a union of the sexes! She does so, however, no more! Philosophy then, at best, is as uncertain in her deductions as Nature is uncertain in her operations. I repeat, then, that the uniformity of Nature's actions in the FUTURE is not provable, Atheism being judge. A hog has observed, or experienced, that his owner feeds him in the morning "uniformly," and he expects it again. But can he prove it? Just as easily as man can prove the future by the past. This judgment of the hog may have been based upon an induction of facts, extending perhaps through a hog's long lifetime--he always was fed at that time. This hog "reasoned" (Dr. H. would say) "according to the inductive method"--"the Baconian method." That "the stone will fall" (although we do not doubt it) is not provable; and therefore not (as the Dr. asserts) a "conclusion " of reasoning, or from reasoning, but a mere postulatum or ultimate premise. If, however, the Dr. will call it a "conclusion," he of course can use that term in as many senses as he pleases. Thus he may say, if he likes, that "that hog 'reasoned by induction,' and drew his 'conclusion' logically." We prefer, however, to use terms in a fixed sense where that can be done.
    I have shown, in a previous communication, that if "induction" be an infallible method, or any method at all, of reasoning (as Dr. H. mistakenly supposes), that it would prove our major premise, and thus lay a sure foundation for Deism. All mechanism, where we have come to know its cause, is found to be the work of mind. Combining this with the fact that Nature's works do exhibit order and arrangement, Deism follows. But the fact that past experience has found mechanism universally the effect of mind does not prove that all mechanisms will, when their cause is revealed, be found the result of intelligence. The premise that "all mechanism, wherever found, is the work of mind," is not a "conclusion" from reasoning: but is itself the very postulate from which our conclusions flow; it cannot be proved to a mind in which causality predominates. There will be no doubt of its truth. To a mind, in which that power is wanting, mechanism does not, nor cannot raise the idea of a cause.
    True, indeed, is it, that experience always has found order to be the work of mind, in all cases where the cause has come to our knowledge. But it is not this experience alone that makes us feel that such must necessarily be the case. The feeling is intuitive, where there is causality, and not so when that organ is defective. But what higher proof can there be (if there can be any) that Nature's mechanisms are the work of mind, than the simple fact that an organ exists which by virtue of its nature causes this feeling of causation spontaneously to arise?
    Mr. Editor, should the coppers always turn up "heads" for every throw that you can make in a year, I apprehend you would be intuitively impressed that an invisible intelligent cause guided the "luck"; or should you want a stronger case, if the letters of the alphabet should spell out your name, when "ruffled" and thrown out, a hundred times going, you would feel what is called an "intuition" that the cause was intelligent and unseen. Call it, however, if you choose, a conclusion of, or from reasoning; pray, what premises was it derived from? All you can say is, "chance cannot do all this." But PROVE that chance or accident did not do it. You can give me no proof, only the simple fact that you are constituted so to feel. This example will serve to explain what is meant by intuitive impressions. But why should the conviction seize us that there was an unseen mind guiding the coppers? You might say, "experience taught you" that intellect alone was adequate to such a result, and that you "reasoned from experience." Have it so, then. So then do I reason (if you will) that intelligence alone is adequate to the arrangements which I see in Nature.
    The spelling out of your name by accident--letters all right side up--in line, &c., &c.--presents a more difficult problem than the arrangement of the parts of your body. An unthinking cause produces an Atheist--"right side up"--in line--teeth mash together, eyes adjusted upon the known (though long unknown) principles of optics--eyes at the top--feet at bottom--a hinge at the knee, a ball and socket where rotatorial motion is wanted, &c. Why, Sir, it seems, when all is enumerated, that the spelling of a name by a chance throw is not a "patching!"
    Atheism, says George Combe, is the result of a peculiar defect, or minus development of causality. The truth of this I do not vouch; but true it is, that Cook found the New Hollanders without any ideas of an intelligent Providence, and phrenology shows that they rank lowest in this part of the brain.
    Rogue River Valley (Oregon), May 22, 1857.
Boston Investigator, July 15, 1857, page 1

    MR. EDITOR:--Belief, I find, is not under the control of the will. I had resolved, like yourself, not to believe that a table was ever moved, except by mechanical force. But I see so many statements of such facts having occurred, and see so many persons who say they have seen the like, that I find myself believing notwithstanding my natural skepticism. But what if tables do dance and cut up shines--what then? It only shows that we have made one more discovery in natural science, viz., that the will-influence can be made to operate beyond the circumference of the magnet; and when the phenomena of table-moving becomes as common as the phenomena of the common magnet, it will then be no more miraculous. And a certain amount of testimony, from a credible source, will convince a person who is ignorant of the fact of table-moving, just as easily as one who is ignorant of the common magnet. Had both been discovered at the same time, the public would have been as incredulous of the one as the other; and, as there are no known principles by which to account for table-moving, so also there are no known principles which will explain the phenomena of the common magnet.
    If anybody has discovered WHY the common magnet attracts steel, let him show how the thing is done! Table-tipping is "incredible" simply because of its newness. When we say--"Such and such a thing is contrary to Nature's laws," all we can reasonably mean is, that it is not in conformity with our past experience. When we get to know each and all the laws of Nature, we will then be able to decide whether a particular story is false or true. There can nothing happen contrary to Nature's laws; yet many things may occur which are not in conformity to our limited KNOWLEDGE of Nature's laws. A more extensive acquaintance with Nature would have led the Islander to understand and believe that water becomes so hard that elephants could walk upon its surface. As it was, however, this fact, when stated, was contrary to his experience of Nature's law. A miracle is only something out of the line of general experience. Thus the miraculous conception of Christ was out of the line of common experience. Man first came into being in a way not in conformity to our present general experience.
    Mr. Editor, has man already reached the ultimatum of knowledge? Who believes so? If not now at the end of his rope, tell when, if you can, he will arrive at the end of discovery? Why not then just say at once that we have lately made one of those new discoveries, viz., that the will-influence may act beyond the limits of the body? Now, if the thoughts of one person may become known to another by some other means than light or sound, this too should be classed, not as a falsehood, but as a new step in Nature's secrets. And if Nature keeps on and continues to yield her secrets, why despair of at length proving the humbug of the soul's existence? Hume's old argument was that "it is much more common for man to lie than for tables to 'tip'"--that is quite true; but its force as an argument is at an end. It was much more common for men to lie than new continents to be discovered, but the continent is discovered notwithstanding; and so, also, do the tables tip. When spirit communication is fully proven, we will then just simply class it along with its fellows, and call it a new discovery; but we say it is not proven yet to our satisfaction. There is not one fact in Spiritualism but may be accounted for without supposing that man has any conscious existence beyond this life. What if a table does move? Does that prove that immortal spirits of the dead exist? What if the answers are intelligent? Does that prove that the intelligence manifested is due to none but the departed? What if the fiddles do play without a visible performer? Does that show that living men do not do it in some unknown way?
    I acknowledge that the playing of a harp without mechanical force is strange indeed; but it is just as easy to conceive that the spirit which plays it is in the flesh, as that it is out of the flesh; and why not refer it to an intelligent cause, known to exist, than to a like cause, not known to exist? Man, we know, exists: Spirits we do not know to exist. Nevertheless, if the phenomena could not be accounted for upon any other hypothesis, then we, of course, would receive the spirit theory.
    Rogue River Valley (Oregon), July 1st, 1857.
Boston Investigator, August 26, 1857, page 1

    MR. EDITOR:--Philosophers are well agreed that a certain configuration of brain is constantly attended with certain peculiar mental characteristics; that the absence of certain portions of brain is always attended by absence of certain mental qualities, and the presence of certain portions always attended with certain mental qualities--hence we call this constant coincidence a law of Nature. Up to this point, all observers are agreed. But now the questions arise, 1st, do these constantly attendant phenomena stand in the relation of cause and effect? and if so, 2ndly, which is the efficient cause? 1st, is the organ of cautiousness in the living brain and the corresponding function related as cause and effect? 2nd, if so, is the presence of this organ the efficient cause of terror, fear, and circumspection? Upon this most vital point hinges great and important issues. Let us first place upon the record, following each other, the opinions of O. S. Fowler and Geo. Combe--the latter acknowledged to be the greatest of living philosophers:
    "The organs of acquisitiveness, destructiveness, &c., are only instruments of the corresponding propensities, and not the propensities themselves, nor the CAUSES of them; and their development is in a great degree the EFFECT and not the cause of the exercise of the corresponding passions; hence very large acquisitiveness, destructiveness, instead of urging their possessors to theft and violence, are merely instruments by means of which these vicious passions are exercised."--[Practical Phrenology by O. S. Fowler, page 385.
    "The leading fact, then, which arrests our attention in this inquiry is that every crime proceeds from some abuse of some faculty or other; and the question immediately arises, whence originates the tendency to abuse? Phrenology enables us to answer, from three sources. 1st, from particular organs being too large, and spontaneously active; 2nd, from great excitement produced by external causes, or 3rd, from ignorance of what are uses and what are abuses of the faculties."--[Combe's Constitution of Man, page 295.
    Here we see, while Mr. Fowler is stoutly maintaining that "very large" animal organs have no tendency to even "URGE" their possessor to abuse them, Mr. Combe is maintaining that the tendency to abuse them originates in their being unduly developed; but let us contrast their views a little farther:
    "And size of these organs shows only how much their guilty possessor has chosen to exercise the corresponding propensities. The size of an organ, then, does not cause the strength of the corresponding propensity, but is itself caused by the strength of the passion. It is true, indeed, that when an organ is very large, the corresponding faculty is spontaneously the more powerful and well nigh uncontrollable; but the guilty individual had no right thus to indulge the passion and thereby enlarge the organ. The same principle, reversed, applies to the small organs. When a given organ, say conscientiousness or veneration, is small, this deficiency shows, not that the individual cannot be just or worship his Maker, but simply that he has not been and done so."--[Pract. Phrenology by O. S. Fowler, p. 389.
    "The moral and intellectual powers next demand, what is the cause of particular organs being too large and active in individuals? Phrenology, for answer, points to the law of hereditary descent, by which the organs most energetic in parents determine those which shall predominate in the child. Intellect then infers that, according to this view, certain individuals are unfortunate at birth, in having received organs from their parents so ill proportioned that abuse of them is almost an inevitable consequence if they are left to the sole guidance of their own suggestions. Phrenology replies that the fact appears to be exactly so. Moreover, intellect perceives, and the moral sentiments acknowledge, that these causes exist independently of the will of the offender. The criminal is not the cause of the unfortunate preponderance of the animal organs in his own brain."--[Combe's Constitution of Man, p. 296.
    Here we see while Mr. Fowler maintains that the "guilty" individual is the "guilty" cause of the spontaneous activity and great size of his animal organs, Mr. Combe maintains the exact opposite. Mr. Editor, it is a sad commentary upon the fallibility of human reason to witness such conflicting opinions by those who pretend to be the true expounders of the book of Nature to mankind! Mr. Fowler tells us, in his chapter on "Causality," that the only cause of failure in not arriving at true conclusions is the want of sufficient data or from feebleness of the organ of causality. Now, either himself or Mr. Combe has "feeble" causality, or else there is not sufficient data to enable one to arrive only at conjectural opinions in relation to the points in dispute between them, himself being judge. When Mr. Fowler says that "a deficient organ of conscientiousness shows not that the individual cannot be honest, but simply that he has not been and done so," and by parity of reasoning that "defective reasoning organs show not that the individual cannot be a good reasoner, but simply that he HAS not been and done so," he leaves me no room only to suspect that his causality is not as strong as it might be!
    The fallacy of petitio principii lurks through all that Mr. Fowler has ever written upon moral philosophy. For example, take the following: "If an individual wish to reduce the size of an organ, let him cease to exercise the corresponding faculties, and it will be done; let the blacksmith swing up in a sling his hand which he has made strong by exercise, and it will soon dwindle away." (Ph. p. 339.) Here are two points covertly assumed: 1st, that an individual in whom the animal organs entirely predominate can "cease" and choose to cease to exercise them from an act of free will. Now this is the very point in dispute, and which he all the while pretends to be establishing! Combe says, "Predominant animal organs will not guide themselves to virtue, and the directing power then must be supplied by other minds," 2nd, it is covertly assumed that an abstract entity called mind exists; that this mind has a free will power; that the organs are the mere "instruments" of this mind; that this free-will mind can exercise any organ of the brain at pleasure, or let it alone, just as a carpenter uses his adz, or a blacksmith his right arm; that the same relation exists between this mind's free will as exists between our will and the voluntary muscles. What a tissue of assumptions! If the chances of his being wrong in his conclusions be in proportion to the joint product of his doubtful premises, there are some 700 chances of his being: wrong to 1 of being right!
    Let us see. Mr. Fowler says, "Sir, if you wish to "reduce the inordinate size of your organ of 'love of life,' just cease to exercise its functions; cease to care anything about your life, and the organ will soon dwindle away!" Mr. Editor, is not such philosophy what you sometimes call "twaddle"? "If you wish to lessen your inordinate 'bump' of caution, cease being terrified at approaching danger, and the organ will soon grow smaller!" If you wish to diminish your combativeness and destructiveness, cease to get angry when a fellow spits in your face! In maintaining this doctrine, that the will bears to the animal organs the same relation that it does to the voluntary muscles, Mr. Fowler has evidently got the cart before the horse.
    If this hypothesis of Mr. Fowler is true, that the organs are, in a true and proper sense, only INSTRUMENTS, then the mind or will acts first, and the brain is acted upon by the will power. When I lift a hoe, I move before the hoe; and if this figure or relation is the same as that subsisting between the supposed mind and brain, then mind first moves, and then communicates this motion to the organs. Thus mind is supposed to act independent of brain, and on the brain; but it is said, "Mind cannot act without brain in this life." Again, if the mind possesses this free will power of suspending the action of the organs, what evidence have we that the best developed brains will not yet turn out in the end the worst of characters? How do we know but the free will powers of the individuals will not "cease" to exercise their highly developed moral organs, and let them all "dwindle away" like a blacksmith's arm in a "sling"? and what assurance does Mr. Fowler's hypothesis give us that he himself will not, by his free will power, obtain lodgings in Sing Sing or Auburn? None whatever. His will, being free, is governed by no law of Nature in its determinations, and is, therefore, no longer within the sphere or range of causality.
    How, I ask, can causality predict the course which a being will choose, if that being's choice is governed by no law? (Deity himself is governed by the eternal laws of his own essence and nature.) Again, what assurance does Mr. Fowler's hypothesis give us that those old and inveterate criminals, which Mr. Combe pronounced to be incorrigible, will not, by an act of volition or free will, so "dwindle" down their great animal organs and increase their moral organs, that they will become patterns of piety in--"a very short time"? I ask, who knows, since Mr. F. declares, on page 390, that "they are as free to cultivate one organ as another, and perfectly free to cultivate any organ to any desirable extent?"
    Mr. Editor, as I write from a great distance, please insert the whole of this much too long communication. My intention is simply to call the attention of philosophers to an important question, and to prevent science from becoming corrupted by false dogmas.
    Rogue River Valley (Oregon), Aug. 1st, 1857.
Boston Investigator, September 16, 1857, page 1

    MR. EDITOR:--All I intended at the outset was to show that the conclusion of Dr. Hammett, that "no Deity exists," did not follow from his premises. Dr. Hammett commits the fallacy of assuming as demonstrated, "that no Deity exists," merely because he is able to show that a certain argument, used to prove God's existence, is fallacious! Because "adaptation alone" does not prove a Deity, "therefore no Deity exists"! Would he deny the truth of a proposition merely because he sees that someone's argument in support of that proposition is fallacious?
    Deists do not maintain that "adaptation alone" proves a Deity. On the contrary, they say that the eternal adaptations of space and matter, as well as the eternal adaptations of God and matter, do not and cannot indicate a designing cause. The Dr.'s syllogism is at last before your readers:
    Major--"If one admitted instance of regular adaptation had no designing cause, it cannot be inferred that the world and its inhabitants were formed by design from the fact alone that their structure exhibits regular adaptation;
    Minor--But (whether a Deity exists or not) some admitted instance of regular adaptation had no designing cause--
    Conclusion--Therefore, it cannot be inferred that the world and its inhabitants were formed by design from the fact alone that their structure exhibits regular adaptation."
    Now, instead of the conclusion here expressed, the Dr. dexterously substitutes another, viz., "Therefore no Deity exists." Let us take a similar syllogism, viz.--
    Major--"If one admitted instance of an animal exists without a liver, it cannot be inferred that the lion has a liver from the 'fact alone' that he is an animal;
    Minor--But one animal is admitted as existing without a liver--
    Conclusion--Therefore, it cannot be inferred that the lion has a liver from the 'fact alone' that he is an animal."
    Now, suppose that, instead of the conclusion here expressed, another and different one had been artfully submitted, viz., "Therefore, the lion has no liver"? This would be doing just what Dr. Hammett has done in the syllogism he has placed before your readers.
    Now, is it not plain that the admission, that the bear has no liver, does not necessarily involve the admission that the lion may have no liver, only from him who should infer or contend so "from the fact alone" that the lion was an animal?
    He who contends that "adaptation alone" proves a Deity stands confuted whenever he admits that some, or one, adaptation exists without design; yet he, who so refutes his opponent, does not thereby prove that "no Deity exists."
    Now mark! We do not infer that goats ruminate from the "fact alone" that they are animals.
    So, neither do we infer that the knee joint was designed to bend, from the "fact alone" that it exhibits adaptation.
    We infer that the goat ruminates from the fact that it belongs to the class of horned animals.
    We infer that the knee was designed to bend, from the fact that we are able to refer it to the class of mechanical arrangements.
    Oh! but says the Dr., "This is virtually to infer design from its adaptation alone." Not so; no more than the inference that an animal ruminates from the fact that it wears horns "is virtually to infer" the same from the fact that it is an animal only.
    Dr. Hammett grants not one "fact alone," but two, viz., 1st, Man had a cause; 2nd, His structure exhibits adaptation.
    Now is this not sufficient to establish Deism? I know, indeed, that some Deists have used the word "adaptation" in a careless and indefinite manner; and if I should say that man must have had a cause, from the fact that his structure exhibited adaptation, the Dr. would reply--"You admit that some adaptations are eternal," "therefore man is eternal"; and this conclusion would be just as fairly proven, and in the same manner, as the one that "no Deity exists." Thus, the Dr. can prove, out of a man's own admissions, that man is eternal, and yet he don't feel like receiving the conclusion as a truth.
    But Deists do infer that man had a beginning, and an intelligent cause, from the mechanical arrangement of his structure. The Dr. replies that this is "virtually" to infer from adaptation "alone." This constitutes his constant blunder. True is it, that all mechanical arrangements are adaptations, but all adaptations are not mechanical arrangements. All goats are animals, but all animals are not goats. He who infers a quality from the fact that A is a goat, does not do so from the fact that A is an animal. So, he who infers from mechanism does not do so from the fact that mechanism is adaptation.
    The Dr. has it this way: "He who infers a quality of a goat, infers from an animal, because a goat is an animal." "He who infers from mechanism, infers from adaptation, because mechanism is adaptation." It is not the fact that goats are animals only, or that mechanisms are adaptations only, that the respective inferences are drawn from.
    Thus, Mr. Editor, have I trailed this wary skeptic through all his winding labyrinths. His logic bears not the test of scientific analysis. But why, after all, have I not a right to use his admissions against himself, as well as he my admissions against myself? He admits that man had a beginning and a cause, viz., old "regular adaptation," and he likewise admits that our structure exhibits adaptation.
    Well, are not here two important premises conceded? and does he who argues from both of them, infer from adaptation "alone"? Now, if Deists had admitted that some adaptations had non-intelligent causes, the Dr. would have had them fast; but, as it happens, the eternal adaptations, admitted by Deists, have no cause by hypothesis.
    But the Dr. said, "The works of Nature exhibit adaptation alone." True, the works of Nature all exhibit adaptation, and also the things adapted; so does a certain enclosure contain only animals; but remember, that the word "animal" includes both frogs and lizards.
    But Dr. Hammett is author of another syllogism, besides the famous one above considered. It is as follows:
    Major--"No one can infer an intelligent cause from the fact that the works of Nature exhibit adaptation only;
    Minor--The works of Nature exhibit adaptation only--
    Conclusion--Therefore, no one can infer that the works of Nature have an intelligent cause."
    Here follows a similar syllogism:
    Major--No one can infer that a hole can be bored, from the fact that his "kit" exhibits implements only;
    Minor--The "kit" of a mechanic exhibits implements only--
    Conclusion--Therefore, no mechanic can infer that a hole can be bored.
    Both these syllogisms look specious at first sight. The answer is, to the first, that the term "adaptation" includes mechanism, order, and a host of other species, from which intelligence is inferred. The answer to the second is, that the word "implement" embraces bits, gouges, and augers, by either of which a mechanic can easily make a hole.
    We now give Dr. Hammett over to hardness of heart and reprobacy of mind.
    Rogue River Valley (Oregon), Sept. 1st, 1857.
Boston Investigator, December 2, 1857, page 1

    MR. EDITOR:--In maintaining that the human mind is so constituted as to believe that "like causes will produce like effects under like circumstances," and that "peculiar arrangements of matter are the effects of mind," we do not wish to be understood as maintaining that these maxims are true simply from the fact that they are universally believed. Neither do we insist that there is a material "extended" universe simply because such is the universal belief of mankind. The earth was once believed to be a flat plane, around which the sun and stars revolved, but this universal belief did not prove that it was flat. Does the fact that "man is constantly liable to err in his conclusions," in the least shake Dr. Hammett's confidence in that particular maxim, which asserts "that like causes will produce like effects"? if so, why does he quote this maxim so often? According to Dr. H., this maxim is as much a "conclusion" of or from reasoning as any other conclusion; and if so, then, according to Dr. H., it may be erroneous.
    Now, while he maintains it to be a "conclusion" of reason, I, on the contrary, maintain that it lies at the foundation of all reasoning; and that we cannot begin to reason until we first assume the truth of this maxim as a premise; that, therefore, the maxim itself is not a conclusion derived from reasoning, but an ultimate judgment, derived from "simple perception" or comparison of facts. This distinction is of vital importance, and should be borne in mind. By the phrase "ultimate judgment," is not meant a self-evident judgment, as Dr. H. mistakenly supposes. There are no self-evident judgments outside of mathematics, except those which relate to facts immediately perceived by the senses. Even the proposition that "a stone, under given circumstances, will fall," is, according to Dr. H., "a conclusion": and if so, not self-evident, unless there be such a thing as a "self-evident conclusion"! Dr. Hammett alleges that I "cannot sustain the position" that the proposition, which alleges that mechanism must have an intelligent author, "is a self-evident proposition." I did not call it "self-evident," but "ultimate." But why call upon a man to prove that a certain proposition is self-evident? Whoever was able to prove that which is self-evident? Dr. Hammett has strange ideas indeed!
    We maintain, then, that the maxims that "like causes under like circumstances will produce like effects," and "mechanism has an intelligent author," are elementary judgments, derived immediately from an induction of facts. By which phrase (induction of facts) is meant the act of bringing in, one by one, of examples to warrant our laying down the premises (not "conclusion") of our argument. Even Atheists boast that Deists "cannot prove by argument that the mechanical arrangement of the human frame is the effect of design," and this is quite true. We cannot prove by argument our major and ultimate premise, that "all mechanism is of design," because it is an ultimate premise, derived from (if not innate) immediate comparison of facts. There are no other more elementary premises back of it, and standing between it and simple facts. Now, if this maxim is not an ultimate judgment, derived immediately from facts, then it is a "conclusion," true or false, derived from premises, true or false, which lie between it and facts; and if so, where are those premises, and what are they? I fail to discover any.
    All writers upon natural theology take the premises for granted, and content themselves with merely establishing the "minor" premise, that "Nature does exhibit examples of mechanism." Paley's reason, why that watch had not "lain there forever," was that it was a mechanized substance; taking it entirely for granted (as he had to) that mechanism, if established, was sufficient. Indeed, I have shown, by the example of the "coppers" and letters, that the mind is so constituted as to grant that certain peculiar arrangements of matter are due only to intelligence, and that this peculiar arrangement is the highest and only evidence of the fact.
    Now we have before explained that the term "mechanism" is not of as extensive signification as the term "adaptation," and, therefore, that one can maintain that "all mechanism is of intelligence," and deny that "all adaptations are of intelligence"; just as one can admit that "all animals are not web-footed," and still maintain that "all ducks are web-footed"; and it would be futile to reply that "a duck is merely an animal." Yet Dr. H. attempts what is equally absurd: he replies that mechanism is "merely adaptation," and that we are "VIRTUALLY" predicating intelligence of adaptation! Dr. Hammett's argument, then, launched against adaptation, hits no one, unless he is weak enough to maintain that "ALL adaptation is due to design"--a proposition we have expressly denied.
    Rogue River Valley (Oregon), Oct, 15, 1857.
Boston Investigator, January 6, 1858, page 1

    Dr. Hammett makes frequent reference to the maxim that "like effects must have like causes," yet entirely rejects its application when he is bound, as a disputant, to admit its full force, for he expressly says, "Nature SEEMS to act as though she were intelligent"--that is, in other words, "These effects are SIMILAR to the effects of intelligence." Why not then admit that their cause is intelligent, as the maxim requires? He has admitted all that the most strenuous Deist ever attempted to prove, namely, that there "SEEMS" to be an intelligent cause in Nature.
    But Dr. H. insists that the true interpretation of this maxim requires that the Deity be an organized being, possessing eyes, mouth, nose, hands, and stomach, for, says he, if the Deity had not these, "how could he invent their organs?" Let us see. When Dr. H. hears a familiar tune, and no visible performer (as LaRoy Sunderland alleges), does this maxim require that the cause be flesh and blood? If not, then in what sense does the maxim require similarity of cause? Simply, I apprehend, that the cause be real and sufficiently intelligent.
    Dr. Hammett, in assuming that consciousness in man is the effect of organization, and that therefore, from analogy, the same must be true of the Deity, is treading upon doubtful ground. If consciousness be the direct sequence of organization, why are we not conscious in sound sleep? Organization is not destroyed by sleep. Yet, according to Dr. H., the cause (organization) remains, but the effect (consciousness) ceases! If mind be a substance, then its elements are eternal, and Deity, being eternal by hypothesis, never "BECAME" conscious of his own existence.
    Dr. Hammett is like one who, being driven from the open ground, plunges into a thicket so dense that neither pursuer nor pursued can tell where he is drifting--he plunges into the profound mysteries of mind and its phenomena, where the wise and foolish are alike bewildered. I have all along admitted that adaptation is eternal in the universe, that iron, from its greater density, is adapted to cut wood, when properly wrought into shape--that space is "adapted" to contain matter, not that mind is "adapted" to produce organization. But these admissions do not entitle Dr. Hammett to assume that the inherent properties of unconscious matter are such as at least to "become conscious of its own existence."
    Dr. Hammett has been forced to lay down his proposition with a material qualification; he now says, "Nature is constant within certain moderate limits"--this is all we ask. But Dr. Hammett has settled it that man came originally from an egg, and he quotes the maxim ("every living being came from an egg"). The plain version of this is that matter had an eternal inherent tendency to combine spontaneously into two eggs about the same time, one in close proximity to the other; the one containing the rudiments of a man, and the other the rudiments (precious rudiments) of a woman. Then unthinking old adaptation took care that these eggs were not allowed to become "addled." No doubt adaptation labeled them, "Right side up with care"--and finally they were "hatched" (bless that day!).
    Now, Mr. Editor, if this tendency was "inherent" in matter, it is still inherent. Why not look with hope and confidence for more eggs, then, in due season? An account was given not long since in the Investigator, of the finding of the fossil remains of two enormous egg shells upon the island of Madagascar, not referable to any known species. May not these shells have once contained the rudiments of the human race? If Dr. Hammett is right--they may.
    But Dr. H. insists that, since the proximate cause of man and animals (pro-creation) is the action of non-intelligent matter, so also, "by analogy," their prime cause must be non-intelligent. This is about as philosophical as to urge that, since the proximate cause of motion in a boat is non-intelligent elastic steam, therefore boat, machinery, and all, are the result of non-intelligent forces! But the position (that if the proximate cause be non-intelligent, so also must the prime cause), proves too much, for the immediate cause of a watch is an intelligent being, so also must its prime cause be intelligent, by the Doctor's own rule.
    According to Dr. Hammett, the prime cause of a watch or will is the "non-intelligent, non-ordial, eternal adaptation inherent in matter." This formed man, and man made the watch! Thus when the proximate cause (man) is intelligent, the prime cause is "non-intelligent adaptation." But when the proximate cause (procreation) is non-intelligent, the prime cause is non-intelligent also! Thus he virtually denies all analogy between proximate and primeval causes, and can claim nothing from his supposed analogy.
    Rogue River Valley (Oregon), Oct. 15, 1857.
Boston Investigator, January 13, 1858, page 1


    P. J. Ryan, Jacksonville (Oregon), sends the following kind letter:
    "Enclosed are five dollars for the Editor of the Investigator, Mr. Seaver. I wish they were five hundred, and they would be, only that I have other duties to perform. 1 also send to friend Seaver my warmest regards.    P. J. RYAN."
    [We are exceedingly obliged to our very kind friend for his liberal donation and generous wishes. He has our warmest thanks, together with the hope that he may live as long and be just as happy, prosperous, and rich, as he wants to be.--ED. INV.]
Boston Investigator, July 30, 1862, page 6


    LIFE AND HAPPINESS.--Mr. Editor:--It appears to be the law of our being that of necessity we must think and act in direct proportion as we are endowed with mental and physical energy, or suffer the penalty. If those energies are properly directed, happiness, peace of mind, and the esteem of all who know us must and will be the consequence. But if improperly directed, the sad reverse must and will be the result. Therefore, we had all better pause and well examine the motives that direct us, if malevolent or benevolent, just or unjust, selfish or unselfish noble or ignoble.
    Jacksonville, Oregon, Nov. 15, 1862.
Boston Investigator, January 7, 1863, page 5


    OLD FRIENDS MENDUM & CO.--Again I send my annual remittance for the good old paper. I don't know but I am a little behind time, but hereafter will try to be more punctual. Please credit for five dollars (money order) and send a receipt.
    We were pleasantly entertained by five lectures from our friend Underwood, which have stirred up a great commotion among the church members, who denounce him and us as OUTCASTS of society. But when he comes back next spring, as promised, he will meet with a heartier welcome than ever before. Hoping good success to you and the good cause,
    I remain yours,    W. BEESON.
    Ashland (Oregon), Nov. 19, 1871.
Boston Investigator, December 13, 1871, page 6

    MR. EDITOR:--After reading a letter from your correspondent "T.R.W.," under date of Oct. 8, where he speaks rather in opposition to the popular idea of organization, and being a little noisily inclined, I beg leave to make a few remarks, as the subject is of vital importance to, at least, the thinking part of humanity. We are glad to see the question agitated, as it is liable to draw out new and valuable ideas.
    Liberals are all aiming at the same object, but the trouble is, they differ so widely in regard to the manner of attaining it. Reason suggests to me that cooperation and organization are both necessary in order to secure the success of any party, whether political, sectarian, or otherwise. We know the impossibility of controlling either national or social affairs without strict adherence to law and usage. We have numbers, but lack organization to effect a unity of sentiment. Our friend "T. R. W." thinks that too much diversity of opinion exists in the ranks of Freethought to permit a submission to such arbitrary rules and by-laws as are necessary in establishing such societies. I would say to that, let us not claim persons as Liberals who are too subtle to submit to the rules and regulations of good society. We will admit the Free Religionist, the Spiritualist, and the Infidel entertain various ideas, though after all they differ only on minor points of interest. Members of the same church today vary vastly farther on some things than many of the classes above-named, still they are ready and willing to unite on the most important objects; in most cases their individuality is not so strongly developed as to destroy their best interests.
    It is intimated by some writers that cooperation is the easiest means of operation; but I would say, without organization it can never be the most effective. The history of the past teaches this plainly on every page. Permanent organization will be established in every district sooner or later, and I would recommend the sooner the better. The Liberal Club of Portland (Oregon), though of recent origin, has a large membership, and is doing a good work. This shows us what we can do provided we are willing to try. Let us follow their example everywhere; unite for the purpose of working for the common good of all. If we are a free people, let us be free in mind as well as in body. Nature never designed intelligent beings to humble themselves to any false creeds. Mythology, theology, or superstition of any kind, as such, was framed by designing men and perpetuated by priests and bigots, who maintain the grandest style, at the expense of their poor, deluded followers.
    It is now time that men should discard their old ideas brought on from the influence of early education, think for themselves, and strive for objects nobler, higher, and more beneficial to their own happiness and the welfare of humanity in general. To this end we earnestly advocate the importance of organization.    J. Q. LATTA.
    Ashland (Oregon), Nov. 17, 1876.
Boston Investigator, December 13, 1876, page 2


    The fact that Women have, by a law of Nature, an equal share in the production of our Race, is a proof of their natural right to an equal share in its national, as well as in its family government.
    It is because men have monopolized this right of Women, that, today, our nation suffers, like a family bereaved of its mother.
    It is not in the masculine nature to know all the details that are needful to sustain the weak, and relieve the suffering, neither have men the same amount of intuitive forethought to provide for emergencies.
    Another fact stares us in the face--
    Our barns are full; we have cattle upon a thousand hills; we have millions scattered over the country, with hundreds of tons of silver and gold coin in our national vaults.
    We have also forests to clear; swamps to drain; roads to make, with abundance of work of every description, and ample means for all the people to live in comfort.
    But, with all these, we have pining want filling our insane asylums, pauper houses, and prisons--moneyless tramps on every road, and thieves in all the walks of life, so that life and property is everywhere in peril.
    Ten years ago, Wendell Phillips said:
    "Unjust monopoly of the rightful homes of the Indians, has caused the slaughter of a million people, and the cost of a thousand million dollars."
    This fact, in connection with our late civil (horrible) war, proclaims the curse of monopoly; and the very graves of our buried soldiers, show us the need of our mothers in the council chambers of our nation.
    We had six candidates for President of the United States--yet, only one of three was likely to have been elected.
    Blaine goes for protective tariff, which means monopoly for a few and poverty for the many.
    Cleveland is for free trade, without one word for free Women; or for the means by which the working chaps may enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuits of happiness; or for the protection of the Indians from lawless outrage.
    Butler is thorough in his anti-monopoly--he recognizes the equal rights of all Mankind, and will sustain the noble sentiments uttered by Thomas Paine--Author hero:
    "The World is my Country, all men are my Brothers--to do good, is my Religion."
Talent, Oregon.
The Watchman, Chicago, December 1884, page 2